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EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW
by
Philip J. Pfeiffer* and W. Wendell Hall**
N recent years, the courts of several states have expressed grave reserva-
tions concerning further judicial erosion of the employment-at-will doe-
trine through expansion of the range of permissible claims for wrongful
discharge.' In recognition of significant adverse consequences for economic
development efforts directed at adding jobs, these courts have reasoned that
if the well-established doctrine of employment-at-will is to be modified, such
action should be taken by elected legislative representatives, not the judici-
ary. The comments of the highest courts of America's two most populous
states, California and New York, are illustrative. The California Supreme
Court recently concluded in Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. that the determi-
nation of whether a duty of good faith and fair dealing should be applied to
the at-will employment relationship, "which has the potential to alter pro-
foundly the nature of employment, the cost of products and services, and the
availability of jobs, arguably is better suited for legislative decisionmaking. '" 2
The court continued: "Legislatures, in making such policy decisions, have
the ability to gather empirical evidence, solicit the advice of experts, and
hold hearings at which all interested parties may present evidence and ex-
press their views .... -3 And, as the New York Supreme Court emphasized
in Murphy v. American Home Products Corp.:
The 1l]egislature has infinitely greater resources and procedural means
to discern the public will, to examine the variety of pertinent considera-
tions, to elicit the views of the various segments of the community that
* Managing Partner, Fulbright & Jaworski, San Antonio. B.S., Sam Houston State
University; J.D., Southern Methodist University.
** Partner, Fulbright & Jaworski, San Antonio. B.A., The University of Texas; J.D., St.
Mary's University.
1. See Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d 1025, 1040
(1985) (fundamental change in employment-at-will doctrine should not be result of judicial
decision); Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal.3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 397 n.31, 254 Cal.
Rptr. 211 (1988) (California legislature better equipped than supreme court to resolve funda-
mental employment issues); Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 65 Haw. 370, 652 P.2d 625, 631
(1982) ("Courts should proceed cautiously if called upon to declare public policy.. ."); Adler
v. American Standard Corp., 290 Md. 615, 432 A.2d 464, 472 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981)
('declaration of public policy is normally the function of the legislative branch"); Melnick v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 106 N.M. 726, 749 P.2d 1105, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 822
(1988); Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 448
N.E.2d 86, 89 (1983) (whether employment-at-will doctrine should be modified is issue better
left to legislature); Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis.2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834, 840
(1983) ("Courts should proceed cautiously when making public policy determinations").
2. 47 Cal.3d 654, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 765 P.2d 373, 397 (1988).
3. Id. n.31 (1988).
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would be directly affected... and to investigate and anticipate the im-
pact of imposition of such liability .... If the rule of non-liability for
termination of at-will employment is to be tempered, it should be ac-
complished through a principled statutory scheme, adopted after oppor-
tunity for public ventilation, rather than in consequence of judicial
resolution of the partisan arguments of individual adversarial litigants.4
Although devoid of any similar expressions of reasoning, the Texas
Supreme Court recently exercised some restraint when asked to create addi-
tional exceptions to the employment-at-will rule. For example, in McClen-
don v. Ingersoll-Rand Co.5 the Texas Supreme Court refused the plea of
McClendon's counsel that the court adopt a duty of good faith and fair deal-
ing in all employment relationships. While the court did create an addi-
tional exception to the at-will rule based upon public policy considerations
favoring the protection of pension or retirement rights, the court did not
embrace the broader exception at issue involving the concept of good faith
and fair dealing.6 In Winters v. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co.7 the Texas
Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff's efforts to expand the public policy
exception set forth in Sabine Pilot Service, Inc. v. Hauck,8 or to adopt a
"whistle blower" exception to the at-will doctrine. Such self-restraint by the
court is not, however, assured for the future. In rejecting the "whistle
blower" exception sought in Winters, the court explained:
Winters admits that he does not come within any of the statutory or
common law exceptions to the at will doctrine. He is asking this court
to recognize a cause of action for private employees who are discharged
for reporting illegal activities. We decline to do so at this time on these
facts.9
These expressions of judicial restraint and the underlying rationale and
logic they represent may well be subverted. As reported in the 1990 survey
article, the Fifth Circuit, in Dean v. Ford Motor Credit Co.,' 0 used an ex-
treme fact situation to justify applying within the workplace the tort of in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress. According to Judge Jolly, who
authored a concurring opinion in Dean, Dean did not "open the door for a
body of new law in the workplace. If I thought so, I would not extend this
nascent cause of action into the field of employee-employer relations."' "
4. 58 N.Y.2d 293, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 448 N.E.2d 86, 89-90 (1983).
5. 779 S.W. 2d 69 (Tex. 1989), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 478, 112 L. Ed. 2d 474 (1990).
6. The Texas Supreme Court's decision in McClendon was reversed by the United States
Supreme Court in Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 111 S.Ct. 478, 112 L.Ed.2d 474 (1990).
The decision of the Supreme Court is discussed in greater detail in text corresponding to infra
notes 302-25.
7. 795 S.W.2d 723 (Tex. 1990).
8. 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985).
9. Winters, 795 S.W.2d at 724-25. The Winters court referred to other jurisdictions
which, through legislative or judicial action, have acted to protect private sector employees
who report illegal activity in the workplace. The concurring opinion of Justice Doggett, joined
by Justices Ray and Mauzy, sets forth what these three justices believe would be the elements
of a whistleblower cause of action. See infra notes 30-40 and accompanying text.
10. 885 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1989).
11. Id. at 308 (Jolly, J., concurring). The court's opinion reveals that it was truly offended
by the facts of the case.
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Notwithstanding Judge Jolly's limiting comment, efforts to expand the appli-
cation of this tort theory into the workplace continue unabated. The recent
decision in Havens v. Tomball Community Hospital 1 2 evidences attempts to
apply this tort theory to workplace situations that are certainly less extreme
than that presented in Dean,13 if they are extreme at all.
If tort theories, such as intentional infliction of emotional distress, which
have historically been considered inapplicable to the employer-employee re-
lationship, are now to be applied without restriction to the workplace, the
principal of at-will employment undoubtedly will be circumvented, if not
emasculated; the doctrine of exclusivity embodied in our worker's compen-
sation laws will be undermined greatly; moreover, the efforts of governmen-
tal and private entities to attract and expand job opportunities in Texas will
suffer a serious set back.
I. EMPLOYMENT AT WILL
Although the Texas Legislature has enacted statutory exceptions to the
employment-at-will doctrine,14 the doctrine has remained intact, with only
12. 793 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1990, writ denied).
13. Other cases involving the intentional infliction of emotional distress theory are dis-
cussed in text accompanying infra notes 89-94.
14. TEx. AGRIC. CODE ANN. § 125.001 (Vernon Supp. 1991) (prohibits discharge for
exercising rights under Agricultural Hazard Communication Act); TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 122.001 (Vernon 1986) (prohibits discharge for jury service); TEx. ELEC. CODE
ANN. § 161.007 (Vernon 1986) (prohibits discharge for attending political convention); TEx.
GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 431.005-.006 (Vernon Supp. 1990) (prohibits discharge for military
service); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4512.7, § 3 (Vernon Supp. 1991) (prohibits dis-
charge for refusing to participate in an abortion); Id. arts. 5154g, 5207a (Vernon 1987) (pro-
hibits discharge for membership or nonmembership in a union); Id. art. 5182b, § 15 (Vernon
1987) (prohibits discharge for exercising rights under Hazard Communication Act); Id. art.
5196g (Vernon 1987) (prohibits discharge for refusing to make purchase from employer's
store); Id. art. 5207c (Vernon Supp. 1991) (prohibits discharge for complying with a sub-
poena); Id. art. 5221k, § 5.01 (Vernon 1987) (Texas Commission on Human Rights Act) (pro-
hibits discharge based on race, color, handicap, religion, national origin, age, or sex); Id. art.
5221k, § 5.05(a) (Vernon 1987) (prohibits discharge for reporting violations of the Commis-
sion on Human Rights Act); Id. art. 5547-300, § 9 (Vernon Supp. 1991) (prohibits discharge
due to mental retardation); Id. art. 6252-16a, §§ 2-4 (Vernon Supp. 1991) (prohibits discharge
of public employee for reporting violation of law to appropriate enforcement authority); Id.
art. 8307c (Vernon Supp. 1991) (prohibits discharge based on good faith workers' compensa-
tion claim); TEx. FAM. CoDE ANN. § 14.43(m) (Vernon Supp. 1991) (prohibits discharge due
to withholding order for child support); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 242.133
(Vernon Supp. 1991) (prohibits discharge of nursing home employee for reporting abuse or
neglect of a resident).
There are also numerous federal statutory exceptions to an employer's right to discharge an
employee at-will. See, eg., National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168
(1988) (prohibits discharge for union activity, protected concerted activity or filing charges or
giving testimony); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e - 2000e-16.
(1988) (prohibits discharge on the basis of race, sex, pregnancy, national origin and religion);
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988) (prohibits dis-
charge due to age-based discrimination); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i
(1988) (prohibits discharge against handicapped persons); Occupational Safety and Health Act
of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988) (prohibits discharge of employees for exercising rights
under the Act); Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1140-
1141 (1988) (prohibits discharge of employees in order to prevent them from attaining vested
pension rights); Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 215-216 (1988) (prohibits
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one narrow public policy exception in the last 103 years.15 In 1985, the
Texas Supreme Court created the first exception to the at will doctrine in
Sabine Pilot Service, Inc. v. Hauck.16 The court held that public policy, as
expressed in the laws of Texas and the United States that carry criminal
penalties, requires an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine when an
employee has been discharged for no reason other than his refusal to per-
form a criminally illegal act ordered by his employer.' 7 In 1989, the Texas
Supreme Court in McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co. 18 created a short-lived
second exception. The court held that public policy favoring the integrity in
pension plans requires an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine
when an employee proves that the principal reason for his discharge was the
employer's desire to avoid contributing to or paying for benefits under the
employee's pension fund. 19 The United States Supreme Court, however,
held that ERISA preempted the McClendon common law cause of action.20
Recently, the supreme court once again was asked to create another ex-
ception to the at-will doctrine. The Texas Whistleblower Act protects state
employees from adverse employment decisions for reporting in good faith a
violation of law to an appropriate law enforcement authority.21 In Winters
v. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. 22 a private employee urged the Texas
Supreme Court to extend the same protection to employees in the private
sector. Winters, an at-will employee, sued the Chronicle alleging that the
discharge for exercising rights guaranteed by the minimum wage and overtime provisions of
the Act); Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009 (1988) (prohib-
its certain pre-employment polygraph testing); Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notifica-
tion Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (1988) (requires notice to employees of plant closing or mass
layoff); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (prohibits
discrimination against individuals with disabilities in employment, housing, public accommo-
dations, education, transportation, communication, recreation, institutionalization, health
services, voting, and access to public services).
15. East Line & R.R.R. Co. v. Scott, 72 Tex. 70, 75, 10 S.W. 99, 102 (1888); see Spiller v.
Ella Smithers Geriatric Center, 919 F.2d 339, 345 (5th Cir. 1990) (Texas Supreme Court "has
decided that a public policy halo surrounds the at-will doctrine"); Manning v. Upjohn Co., 862
F.2d 545, 547 (5th Cir. 1989) (Texas courts not hesitant to declare employment at-will em-
ployee doctrine alive and well); Scott v. Vetco Gray, Inc., No. 89-1839, slip op. at 4 (S.D. Tex.
Nov. 20, 1990) (at-will docrine remains firmly entrenched in Texas common law).
16. 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985).
17. Id. at 735; see Willy v. Coastal Corp., 855 F.2d 1160, 1171 n.16 (5th Cir. 1988) ("Sab-
ine Pilot can be reasonably read as restricted to instances where violations of law the employee
refused to commit 'carry criminal penalties' "). But see Johnston v. Del Mar Distributing Co.,
776 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied). In Del Mar, the court held
that
the Sabine Pilot exception necessarily covers a situation where an employee has
a good faith belief that her employer has requested her to perform an act which
may subject her to criminal penalties. Public policy demands that she be al-
lowed to investigate into whether such actions are legal so that she can deter-
mine what course of action to take (i.e., whether or not to perform the act).
Id. at 771.
18. 779 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. 1989), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 478, 112 L. Ed. 2d 474 (1990).
19. Id. at 71.
20. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, I ll S. Ct. 478, 112 L. Ed. 2d 474 (1990). See infra
notes 302-25 and accompanying text (discussing United States Supreme Court's decision in
Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon).
21. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-16a, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
22. 795 S.W.2d 723 (Tex. 1990).
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Chronicle had wrongfully discharged him because, at various times, he had
reported to Chronicle management that managers and supervisors were en-
gaged in circulation fraud, inventory theft, and a kickback scheme. Winters
argued that the court should extend Sabine Pilot to cover not only employees
who refused to commit crimes, but also those who reported illegal activity to
their employers. The trial court declined and granted summary judgment in
favor of the Chronicle.2 3 On appeal Winters once again argued that the
court of appeals should broaden the Sabine Pilot exception to include em-
ployees who report crimes to their employers.24 The court of appeals de-
clined Winters' invitation to extend Sabine Pilot, noting that as an
intermediate court it was bound to follow the supreme court's authoritative
expressions of law.25 The court of appeals thus aflrmed the trial court's
summary judgment because the Sabine Pilot exception covers only the dis-
charge of an employee for no reason other than the employee's refusal to
perform an illegal act.26
Winters admitted that his claim did not fall within any of the statutory or
common law exceptions to the at-will doctrine, but asked the supreme court
to recognize a cause of action for private employees who are discharged for
reporting illegal activities. 27 While the supreme court declined the opportu-
nity to create a new exception to the at-will doctrine, 28 it may be a short-
lived victory for employers. The court specifically stated that it was declining
Winters' invitation to create a new exception "at this time on these facts."'29
It appears that if the court is presented with the right case, private employ-
ees may enjoy the same protection as public employees for whistleblowing.
Seizing upon the majority opinion's very narrow holding, the concurring
opinion30 took the opportunity to set forth the elements of the cause of ac-
tion for future plaintiffs to allege to properly state a prima facie case.31 Ac-
cording to the concurring justices, to establish a private whistleblower claim
an individual must prove three elements: 1) that the principal3 2 reason for
the employee's discharge was the employee's internal or public report of
23. Id. at 723.
24. 781 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989), aff'd, 795 S.W.2d 723 (Tex.
1990).
25. Id. at 409 (citing Swilley v. McCain, 374 S.W.2d 871, 875 (rex. 1964); Lumpkin v. H
& C Communications, Inc., 755 S.W.2d 538, 540 (rex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1988, writ
denied)).
26. Id.
27. 795 S.W.2d at 724.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 725.
30. Id. at 725-34 (Doggett, J., joined by Ray and Mauzy, JJ.).
31. Id. at 732.
32. Under the supreme court's decision in Sabine Pilot "it is the plaintiff's burden to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his discharge was for no reason other than his
refusal to perform an illegal act." 687 S.W.2d at 735 (emphasis added). Under McClendon,
the supreme court held that if "the principal reason for [the plaintiff's] termination was the
employer's desire to avoid contributing to or paying benefits under the employer's pension
fund," such termination is illegal. 779 S.W.2d at 71. In Sabine Pilot the court states the test in
terms of "sole" cause, while in McClendon and the concurring opinion in Winters phrases the
test in terms of "producing" cause. The test for causation is different and significant for plain-
tiffs and employers. While one court of appeals has recognized the variance, Paul v. P.B.-
1991]
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workplace activities that would have a probable adverse effect upon the pub-
lic; 2) that the employee reported the activities in the workplace in good
faith, rather than as a result of malice, spite, jealousy or personal gain; and
3) that the employee had reasonable cause to believe that the activities would
have a probable adverse effect upon the public. 33 With respect to the latter
element, an individual does not have to prove an actual violation of a statute;
rather, the relevant issue is whether an ordinary employee acting in good
faith had reason to believe that conduct violating a law, or resulting in other
adverse harm to the public, had occurred or was about to occur.3 4 The indi-
vidual must show, however, that the wrongful conduct violates "substantial
societal concerns" reflected in the Texas and federal constitutions and stat-
utes, judicial and administrative decisions, rules and regulations, or other
public policy statements. 35
As noted above, the principal reason for the employer's retaliation must
have been the employee's reporting of the wrongful conduct. 36 To establish
causation, the employee must demonstrate that the employer had knowledge
of the employee's whistleblowing prior to the retaliation and that the dis-
charge occurred within a reasonably short time after one or more complaints
were made.37 The employer may refute the causation element by proving
that the employee was discharged for reasons other than the act of
whistleblowing. 38
The concurring opinion recognized the obvious concern of employers that
internal management disputes not become subjected to inflated and lengthy
jury trials. 39 While the concurring opinion urged the trial courts to grant
summary judgment in appropriate cases, 40 the nature of the claim will make
it extremely difficult to obtain summary judgment. Issues such as good
faith, reasonable cause, the principal reason for the discharge, and the timing
and number of the complaints are fact intensive issues, precluding summary
judgment. Disputes over these elements of the claim will certainly chill any
trial court's desire to grant summary judgment, no matter how frivolous the
claim may appear.
It remains for future cases to provide a definitive statement from a
supreme court majority as to what facts, if any, will support a private sector
whistleblower cause of action. Notwithstanding the detailed discussions set
forth in the concurring opinion, that opinion represents only the views of
three justices, one of whom has now left the court.
K.B.B., Inc., No. B14-90-00107-CV (Tex. App.-HOuston [14th Dist.] Dec. 6, 1990, n.w.h.)
(unpublished), the supreme court has not addressed the issue.
33. Id.
34. Id. & n.20.
35. Id. at 732.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 732-33. The court noted that the number and timing of the complaints is evi-
dentiary. Id. at 733 n.22.
38. Id. at 733.
39. Id. at 732.
40. Id.
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In Hancock v. Express One International, Inc.41 Clay Hancock, a pilot for
Express One, alleged that he was discharged because he refused to fly under
conditions which would violate flight and rest time limitations prescribed by
the Federal Aviation Administration. Violations of these limitations carry
civil penalties ranging from a reprimand to revocation of a pilot's certificate.
Becafse the penalties were not criminal in nature, the trial court granted
Express One's motion for summary judgment. On appeal, Hancock ac-
knowledged that the Sabine Pilot exception applies only to employees who
are discharged for refusing to perform acts which carry criminal penalties;
however, he urged the court to extend Sabine Pilot to include employees
discharged for performing illegal acts which carry civil penalties. 42 The
court declined the invitation to extend Sabine Pilot and held that as an inter-
mediate appellate court it was obligated to follow the law as stated by the
supreme court and could not broaden the deliberately narrow exception cre-
ated in Sabine Pilot.43
In Burt v. City of Burkburnett44 Michael Burt, a police officer for the city,
sued the city for wrongful discharge based upon the Sabine Pilot exception to
the employment-at-will doctrine. Burt arrested a prominent citizen for pub-
lic intoxication; the next day the city gave him the option of resigning with
good references or being fired with a bad work record. Burt resigned, and
the next day he sought to withdraw his resignation. The chief of police ac-
cepted Burt's retraction and then fired him. Burt sued and argued that as a
police officer he is required by statute to arrest those who violate the law and
that failure to do so would be illegal and would subject him to criminal
prosecution. Burt alleged that he was discharged for refusing not to arrest a
prominent citizen for public intoxication and thus for refusing to perform an
illegal act.45 The trial court granted the city's motion for summary judg-
ment and the court of appeals affirmed. The court held that Burt twisted
certain language in Sabine Pilot out of context.46 The court observed that to
state a claim under Sabine Pilot the claimant must allege that the employer
actually required the employee to commit an illegal act.47 Because Burt's
petition contained no such allegation in the summary judgment was
proper.48
41. 800 S.W.2d 634 (Tex. App.-Dalas 1990), writ requested, 34 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 299
(Jan. 30, 1991).
42. Id. at 636.
43. Id. at 636-37. Hancock also argued that the McClendon exception applied to his case.
Id. at 636. Because McClendon was reversed by the United States Supreme Court, this argu-
ment is no longer valid, even though it was rejected by the court of appeals. Id.
44. 800 S.W.2d 625 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, n.w.h.).
45. Id. at 626.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 627. The court noted that in Sabine Pilot the employee was ordered to commit
an illegal act. Id. The court also recognized that in Winters the supreme court held that to fall
within the Sabine Pilot exception, an employee must be "unacceptably forced to choose be-
tween risking criminal liability or being discharged from his livelihood." Id. (quoting Winters,
795 S.W.2d 723, 724 (1990)).
48. Id. In light of its disposition of the case, the court did not address the issue of whether
Burt would have faced criminal penalties for failing to arrest the citizen. Id.
1991]
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A. Common Law Claims
When the term of employment is left to the discretion of either party, or
left indefinite or determinable by either party, then either party may termi-
nate the contract at will and without cause.49 Absent a specific term con-
tract, either the employer or employee may terminate an employment-at-will
relationship at any time, for any reason or no reason, with or without cause,
and without liability for failure to continue employment.50 During the last
several years, however, wrongful discharge litigation based on violation of a
written or oral employment agreement has increased. Written or oral em-
ployment agreements may indeed modify the at-will rule and require the
employer to have good cause for the discharge of an employee.
1. Written Modifications of the Employment-At- Will Doctrine
To avoid the employment-at-will doctrine and establish a cause of action
for wrongful termination based on a written contract, an employee must
prove that he and his employer had a contract that specifically prohibited
the employer from terminating the employee's service at-will.51 The writing
must provide in a special and meaningful way that the employer does not
have the right to terminate the employment relationship at-will. 52 Employ-
ment is therefore generally found to be at-will, absent a writing that specifi-
cally states otherwise.53 The necessity of a written contract arises from the
statute of frauds requirement that, to be enforceable, an agreement that is
not to be performed within one year from the date of the making must be in
writing.54
In Winograd v. Willis55 Judwin Properties offered William Willis a job as
a controller. Because Willis had to resign from his long-term employment
with another company, Willis requested and received writted affirmation of
49. East Line & R.R.R. Co. v. Scotts 72 Tex. 70, 75, 10 S.W. 99, 102 (1888); see also
Pfeiffer & Hall, Employment and Labor Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 42 Sw. L.J. 97, 98-
99 nn.8-9 (1988) (citing several cases discussing employment-at-will doctrine).
50. East Line, 72 Tex. at 75, 10 S.W. at 102; cf Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687
S.W.2d at 735 (holding that at-will employee may not be terminated for refusing to commit
illegal act; noting statutory limitations on employment-at-will doctrine). See generally Op.
Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-941 (1988) (employees of the state generally at-will employees).
51. Stiver v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 750 S.W.2d 843, 846 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1988, no writ); Benoit v. Polysar Gulf Coast, Inc., 728 S.W.2d 403, 406 (Tex. App.-
Beaumont 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Webber v. M.W. Kellogg Co., 720 S.W.2d 124, 127 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
52. Rodriguez v. Benson Properties, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 275, 277 (W.D. Tex. 1989); Mc-
Clendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 757 S.W.2d 816, 818 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988),
rev'd on other grounds, 779 S.W.2d 69, 70 (Tex. 1989), rev'd, Ill S. Ct. 478, 112 L. Ed. 2d 474
(1990) (quoting Benoit v. Polysar Gulf Coast, Inc., 728 S.W.2d at 406; Stiver v. Texas Instru-
ments, Inc., 750 S.W.2d at 846; Webber v. M. W. Kellogg Co., 720 S.W.2d at 127). But cf.
Winograd v. Willis, 789 S.W.2d 307, 310 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied)
(suggesting phrase "in a special and meaningful way" not necessary part of analysis).
53. Webber v. M.W. Kellogg Co., 720 S.W.2d at 127.
54. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01(b)(6) (Vernon 1987); Rodriguez v. Benson
Properties, Inc., 716 F. Supp. at 277; Bowser v. McDonald's Corp., 714 F. Supp. 839, 842
(S.D. Tex. 1989); Winograd v. Willis, 789 S.W.2d at 310-11; Stiver v. Texas Instruments, Inc.,
750 S.W.2d at 846; Benoit v. Polysar Gulf Coast, Inc., 728 S.W.2d at 406.
55. 789 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied).
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his employment in the form of a letter. The letter provided that Willis
would begin no later that October 15, 1981, his annual salary of $52,000 was
to be paid monthly, and that at the end of 1981, his salary would be reviewed
for consideration of an increase and or a bonus. Next to the company repre-
sentative's signature, Willis signed below a line that provided "Accepted and
Agreed." Willis began on October 12, 1981 and, upon termination less than
four months later, sued for wrongful termination of the employment con-
tract. At trial, the jury awarded damages to Willis for breach of his employ-
ment contract. On appeal, Judwin argued that Willis did not have a written
employment contract that limited the employer's right to terminate in a
meaningful and special way.56 Judwin's right to terminate Willis was with-
out cause.57 The court of appeals first noted that if an employer hires an
employee at a stated sum per week, month, or year, then the employment
constitutes definite employment for the period designated and may not be
arbitrarily terminated.58 The court held that Judwin's hiring of Willis based
on an agreement of an annual salary limited in a meaningful and special way
Judwin's prerogative to discharge Willis during the stated period of employ-
ment.59 The court also observed that a written confirmation of an oral con-
tract was unnecessary. 6° Because the statute of frauds61 bars only those
contracts that must last longer than one year,62 the Judwin-Willis contract,
by its own terms, could have been performed in one year (the reference to
the annual salary) and, therefore, did not necessitate a writing.63
In several instances, employees have attempted to avoid the employment-
at-will doctrine by contending that the employee handbook or manual con-
stituted a contractual modification of the at-will rule.64 The Texas courts,
however, adhere to the general rule that employee handbooks not accompa-
56. Id. at 310. In Webber v. M. W. Kellog Co., 720 S.W.2d 124, 127 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the court held that to establish a cause of action for
wrongful discharge the discharged employee must prove that there was a written employment
agreement that specifically provided that the employer did not have the right to terminate the
contract at will. In Benoit v. Polysar Gulf Coast, Inc., 728 S.W.2d 403, 406 (Tex. App.-
Beaumont 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the court added that the writing must "in a meaningful and
special way" limit the employer's right to terminate the employment at will.
57. 789 S.W.2d at 310.
58. Id. (citing Molnar v. Engels, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 224, 225 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Dallas Hotel Co. v. Lackey, 203 S.W.2d 557, 561 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1947, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Dallas Hotel Co. v. McCue, 25 S.W.2d 902, 905 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1930, nb writ)).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Thx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01(b)(1) (Vernon 1987).
62. Winograd, 789 S.W.2d at 310-11 (citing Niday v. Niday, 643 S.W.2d 919, 920 (Tex.
1982); Morgan v. Jack Brown Cleaners, Inc., 764 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989,
writ denied)).
63. Id. at 311.
64. Falconer v. Soltex Polymer Corp., No. 89-2216, slip op. at 8-9 (5th Cir. Sept. 12,
1989) (not published); Bowser v. McDonald's Corp., 714 F. Supp. at 842; Glagola v. North
Tex. Mun. Water Dist., 705 F. Supp. 1220, 1224 (E.D. Tex. 1989); Valdez v. Church's Fried
Chicken, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 596, 622 (W.D. Tex. 1988); Abston v. Levi Strauss & Co., 684 F.
Supp. 152, 156 (E.D. Tex. 1987); Salazar v. Amigos Del Valle, Inc., 754 S.W.2d 410, 413 (Tex.
App.---Corpus Christi 1988, no writ); Stiver v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 750 S.W.2d at 846; see
also Comment, The Vestiges of the Texas Employment At- Will Doctrine in the Wake of Progres-
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nied by an express agreement mandating specific procedures for discharging
employees do not constitute written employment agreements. 65 Employees
are, thus, still subject to the employment-at-will doctrine. 66
In Hicks v. Baylor University Medical Center67 Baylor employed Hicks for
an indefinite period of time. Subsequently, Baylor distributed an employee
handbook to Hicks which contained provisions for a three-month probation-
ary period and a grievance procedure for its employees. 68 When Hicks re-
ceived the handbook, he signed an acknowledgment card that specifically
stated that the employee handbook was subject to change and could be mod-
ified, superceded, or even eliminated at any time. The card also recited that
the employee understood that the handbook did not constitute a contract
between him and Baylor.69 Baylor later terminated Hicks for allegedly swal-
lowing a marijuana cigarette. Hicks denied using marijuana and sued for
wrongful discharge, alleging that the employee handbook created contract
rights that obviated application of the at-will rule.70 Baylor moved for sum-
mary judgment on the basis that the employee handbook did not limit Bay-
lor's right to discharge Hicks at-will. The trial court granted Baylor's
motion and the court of appeals affirmed. The court of appeals observed the
sive Law: The Employment Handbook Exception, 18 ST. MARY'S L.J. 327 (1986) (applying
principles of consideration and mutuality to employment handbooks).
65. Falconer v. Soltex Polymer Corp., No. 89-2216, slip op. at 8-9; Manning v. Upjohn
Co., 862 F.2d 545, 547 n.2 (5th Cir. 1989); Joachim v. AT&T Information Sys., 793 F.2d 113,
114 (5th Cir. 1986); Bowser v. McDonald's Corp., 714 F. Supp. at 842; Valdez v. Church's
Fried Chicken, Inc., 683 F. Supp. at 622; Abston v. Levi Strauss & Co., 684 F. Supp. at 156;
Hicks v. Baylor Univ. Medical Center, 789 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied);
Musquiz v. Diamond Shamrock and Refining Co., No. 04-88-00093-CV (Tex. App.-San
Antonio July 12, 1989, no writ) (not published); Salazar v. Amigos Del Valle, Inc., 754 S.W.2d
at 413; Stiver v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 750 S.W.2d at 846; Benoit v. Polysar Gulf Coast,
Inc., 728 S.W.2d at 407; Webber v. M.W. Kellogg Co., 720 S.W.2d at 128; Berry v. Doctor's
Health Facilities, 715 S.W.2d 60, 61 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ); Totman v. Control
Data Corp., 707 S.W.2d 739, 744 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ); Vallone v. Agip
Petroleum Co., 705 S.W.2d 757, 759 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Reynolds Mfg. Co. v. Mendoza, 644 S.W.2d 536, 539 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1982, no
writ). Contra Aiello v. United Air Lines, Inc., 818 F.2d 1196, 1198 (5th Cir. 1987).
66. McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 757 S.W.2d 816, 818 (Tex. App.-Houston (14th
Dist.] 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 779 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 111 S.
Ct. 478, 112 L. Ed. 2d 474 (1990).
67. 789 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied).
68. The 1983 handbook Hicks acknowledged receiving provided that "[e]mployment may
be terminated by 3 methods other than retirement: (a) resignation, (b) mutual agreement or
request, and (c) immediate discharge." Id. at 302. The 1986 handbook superseded the 1983
handbook and provided that "(tiermination may occur by retirement, resignation, mutual
agreement or immediate discharge." Id.
69. Id. The acknowledgment card provided:
I have received my copy of the employee booklet for Baylor University Medical
Center, which outlines the policies of the medical center and my responsibilities
as an employee. I will read the information in this booklet and I understand
that the information contained in it does not constitute a contract between me and
the medical center.
Since the information in this booklet is subject to change, it is understood that
any changes in Medical Center policies may modify, supercede, or eliminate the
policies listed. Medical Center personnel will be notified of any policy changes
through the usual channel of communication.
Id. (emphasis added).
70. Id. at 300.
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general rule that employee handbooks unaccompanied by an express agree-
ment or written representation regarding procedures for discharge do not
constitute written employment contracts that obviate the at-will rule.71
Relying on Reynolds Manufacturing Co. v. Mendoza 72 and Berry v. Doc-
tor's Health Facilities73 the court held that because Baylor maintained the
right to retain or withdraw the handbook at any time the handbook could
not be a contract. 74 Rejecting Hicks' misplaced reliance on Aiello v. United
Air Lines, Inc.,75 the court also held that the probationary period and the
general grievance procedure in the handbook did not alter the at-will rela-
tionship.76 Rather than determining that Aiello was an incorrect interpreta-
tion of Texas law,7" the court simply distinguished its facts from Aiello: in
Aiello, the employer admitted the existence of an employment contract, but
Baylor did not; the employee in Aiello testified that the employee manual
created a contract, while Hicks formally acknowledged that the handbook
did not create a contract; the Aiello handbook provided detailed discipline
and discharge procedures, which the employer followed and the supervisors
regarded as a contractual obligation, while the Baylor handbook did not
contain such detailed procedures, nor was it intended as the sole means to
terminate employment; and, finally, the Aiello handbook stated that employ-
ees could be discharged only for good cause and the Baylor handbook con-
tained no such representations.78 Since the summary judgment evidence
established, as a matter of law, that the employee handbook did not circum-
scribe Baylor's right to dismiss Hicks at-will, the court affirmed the sum-
mary judgment.79
In Texas Health Enterprises, Inc. v. Gentry80 Sharon Gentry was injured
while working at a nursing home and was denied any benefits for her injury.
At the time Gentry was hired, she signed an acknowledgment of her aware-
ness that the nursing home was not insured under the Texas Worker's Com-
71. Id..at 302 (citing Benoit v. Polysar Gulf Coast, Inc., 728 S.W.2d 403, 406 (Tex.
App.-Beaumont 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Vallone v. Agip Petroleum Co., 705 S.W.2d 757, 759(Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Totman v. Control Data Corp., 707
S.W.2d 739, 744 (rex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ); Reynolds Mfg. Co. v. Mendoza, 644
S.W.2d 536, 539 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1982, no writ)).
72. 644 S.W.2d 536, 539 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1982, no writ) (no contract where
employer retained right to amend or withdraw employee handbook).
73. 715 S.W.2d 60, 61-62 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ) (no contract where employer
had right to unilaterally change employee handbook and where employee signed an acknowl-
edgment that the handbook did not constitute an employment agreement.
74. Hicks, 789 S.W.2d at 303.
75. 818 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1987).
76. Id. at 1201.
77. The incongruity between Aiello and Joachim v. AT&T Information Sys., 793 F.2d 113
(5th Cir. 1986), which Judge Edith Jones highlighted in her well-reasoned dissent in Aiello,
and an analysis of Texas cases establishes Aiello as an aberration and not a correct interpreta-
tion of Texas cases. Aiello, 818 F.2d at 1202 (Jones, J., dissenting); see Ramos v. H. E. Butt
Grocery Co., No. L-85-85 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 1987) (Judge Kazen stating that Aiello and
Joachim could not be reconciled). For a complete discussion of the Fifth Circuit's decisions in
Aiello and Joachim, see Pfeiffer & Hall, supra note 49, at 104-06 (1988).
78. Hicks, 789 S.W.2d at 303.
79. Id.
80. 787 S.W.2d 604 (Tex. App.-Et Paso 1990, no writ).
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pensation Act; however, she was provided an employee handbook which
listed "worker's compensation" as an employee benefit. Gentry testified that
she interpreted this to mean that although the nursing home was not a sub-
scriber to the Texas statutory compensation system, it did, in fact, provide
equivalent benefits. Gentry also testified that she was told that the benefits
were comparable to the state program. Additionally, the assistant adminis-
trator admitted that the injury benefits supplied were in exchange for em-
ployment and part of the employment agreement. Gentry sued for breach of
contract for the denial of injury benefits. The jury found for Gentry and the
court of appeals affirmed. The court held that the testimony of the nursing
home employees and the relevant portions of the employee handbook consti-
tuted sufficient evidence to support a jury finding for breach of contract.8 '
2. Oral Modifications of the Employment-At- Will Doctrine
Usually, an employment relationship is created when employee and em-
ployer agree orally to the terms and conditions of employment. Oral em-
ployment contracts, however, may defeat an employer's right to terminate
an employee-at-will depending upon the terms of the agreement and the
facts and circumstances surrounding the employment.
Schroeder v. Texas Iron Works, Inc.82 is pending before the Texas
Supreme Court and two issues expected to be addressed may have an impor-
tant impact on oral modifications of the at will doctrine. The issues are, first,
whether the employment contract must be in writing, and, second, whether
contracts for an indefinite term are subject to the statute of frauds.83 In
Schroeder Schroeder brought suit against his former employer alleging
wrongful discharge based on breach of an oral contract. Schroeder asserted
that between November 1983 and January 1984 his boss assured him on at
least three occasions that his job was secure until he reached age sixty-five.
At the time of these statements, Schroeder was fifty-seven years old.
Reviewing the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the employer,
the court of appeals observed that the alleged oral employment contract was
within the statute of frauds because it could not be performed in less than
eight years; 84 therefore, summary judgment was proper.85 Schroeder also
argued that Texas Iron Works was precluded from discharging him by vir-
tue of his detrimental reliance under the theory of equitable estoppel.86 Re-
lying upon his boss' statements, Schroeder built a retirement home.
Schroeder's testimony, however, revealed that Texas Iron Works did not
make the alleged assurances in order to induce him to build his retirement
81. Id. at 608.
82. 769 S.W.2d 625 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, writ granted).
83. 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 295 (Mar. 10, 1990).
84. Schroeder, 769 S.W.2d at 628.
85. Id.
86. The court set forth the elements of equitable estoppel: "(1) a false representation or
concealment of material facts (2) made with knowledge of those facts (3) to a party without
knowledge, or means of knowledge, of such facts (4) with the intention that it be acted on, and
(5) detrimental reliance by the party to whom the representation is made." Id. at 629 (citing
Gulbenkian v. Penn, 151 Tex. 412, 415, 252 S.W.2d 929, 932 (1952)).
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home. Moreover, Schroeder admitted that his employer had no more
knowledge than he did of the future downturn in the oil industry and the
corresponding impact on Schroeder's employment. Accordingly, the court
affirmed the summary judgment. 87 The supreme court granted Schroeder's
application for a writ of error and the case is pending before the court.88
3. Discharge and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims
In addition to breach of contract and wrongful termination claims, em-
ployees often claim damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
To prevail under this theory in Texas, the employee must show four ele-
ments: 1) the defendant acted either intentionally or recklessly; 2) this con-
duct was extreme and outrageous; 3) the defendant's actions caused the
emotional distress of the plaintiff; and, finally 4) the emotional distress was
severe.89 While Texas courts have not recognized a cause of action for inten-
tional or negligent infliction of emotional distress arising solely from the act
of termination of employment, 90 the Fifth Circuit,91 two federal district
courts,92 and two courts of appeal have permitted such a claim where the
87. Id.
88. 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 295 (Mar. 10, 1990).
89. Tidelands Auto. Club v. Walters, 699 S.W.2d 939, 942 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1985,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
90. Scott v. Vetco Gray, Inc., No. 89-1839, slip op. at 4 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 1990) (mere
act of wrongful discharge cannot form sole basis for claim of intentional infliction of emotional
distress).
91. Dean v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 885 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1989) (interpreting Texas
law). See Pfeiffer & Hall, Employment and Labor Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 44 Sw.
L.J. 81, 103-05 (1990) (completely discussing Dean facts). In summary, the facts that sup-
ported the plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress included, in addition
to other acts of mental harassment, the supervisor placing company checks in the plaintiff's
purse so that it appeared that she was a thief or to put her in fear of such accusation. While
the conduct in Dean supporting the plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress was in fact extreme, in his concurring opinion Judge Jolly made it clear that Dean does
not "open the door for a body of new law in the workplace." Dean, 885 F.2d at 308 (Jolly, J.,
concurring). Judge Jolly continued, "If I thought so, I would not extend this nascent cause of
action into the field of employee-employer relations. If it were to be done, I would let the
Texas courts do it." Id. Judge Jolly's analysis is correct. Clearly Dean's emotional distress
claim was based on her employer's conduct prior to her discharge and, arguably, unrelated to
her discharge.
92. In Guzman v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., No. SA-88-CA-533 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 16,
1990), a constructive discharge/failure to promote case, Luis Guzman claimed damages for,
inter alia, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and the company moved for summary
judgment. The evidence reflected that during his employment Guzman was subjected to pro-
tracted harangues and verbal assaults from supervising attorneys; that he was threatened, de-
nied various perks and privileges afforded to other persons with similar responsibilities; that he
was kept off various distribution lists and organizational charts; that he was not afforded com-
parable secretarial or support staff services; that he did not receive comparable office space or
furniture; and that he was not included in management functions, all due to his race and
national origin. Id. slip op. at 17-18. Based upon Dean v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 885 F.2d
300 (5th Cir. 1989), the court held that a fact issue existed regarding Guzman's claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress and denied the company's motion for summaryjudgment. Id. slip op. at 18.
In Nicholls v. Columbia Gas Dev., No. 89-2418 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 1990), the court recog-
nized that if an employer does no more than exercise his legal right to discharge an employee,
then it has not committed outrageous conduct in the degree and character required for liability
for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. slip op. at 5 (citing Laird v. Texas Coin-
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conduct giving rise to the emotional distress claim occurred during the em-
ployment relationship and was separate from, or in addition to, the dis-
charge.93 However, no Texas case has held that the single act of discharge
merce Bank-Odessa, 707 F. Supp. 938 (W.D. Tex. 1988)). However, the court held that if a
plaintiff can show facts separate from the discharge that state a cause of action for intentional
or negligent infliction of emotional distress, plaintiff has stated a viable claim. Id. slip op. at 5-
7, 9-11. With respect to Nicholls' claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the
court held that Nicholls failed to raise a genuine issue of a material fact that the company's
conduct constituted extreme and outrageous conduct. Id. slip op. at 7. With respect to Nich-
olls' claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, the court held that Nicholls failed to
raise a genuine issue of material fact that Nicholls suffered any emotional distress. Id. slip op.
at 11.
Finally, in Scott v. Vetco Gray, Inc., No. 89-1839 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 1990), the court
doubted the plaintiff's ability to prove his claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress,
but it held that he had presented sufficient evidence to defeat the defendants' motion for sum-
mary judgment. Id. slip op. at 16. In Scott the plaintiff alleged that the defendants, in re-
sponse to his inquiries, consistently failed to accurately communicate his prospects of
continued employment with the company even though the defendants had knowledge that he
had foregone a job opportunity with a competitor. Id. slip op. at 14-15. The plaintiff alleged
that the defendants' conduct caused him physical and emotional ailments, including depres-
sion, loss of appetite, sleeplessness, embarassment, degradation in having to interview for jobs
with less pay, seeking unemployment benefits, and being forced to live with his parents. Id.
slip op. at 15. The court held that the fact allegations created a fact question for intentional
and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Id. slip op. at 16; see also Tayloi v. Houston
Lighting and Power Co., No. H-89-909 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 21, 1990) (after being questioned by
two supervisors, employee was suspended and voluntarily removed some of belongings from
office and left; thereafter, employee informed by telephone of termination; held, employee
failed to allege any facts of "outrageous conduct" to support claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress).
93. Havens v. Tomball Community Hosp., 793 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist
Dist.] 1990, writ denied); Bushell v. Dean, 781 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989), rev'd
and remanded in part and writ denied in part, 34 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 339 (Feb. 13, 1991). In
Havens, a summary judgment case, the plaintiff, a nurse, sued her former employer, Tomball
Community Hospital and others, alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress and
wrongful discharge. The plaintiff was the head nurse in the maternity unit at the hospital and
was charged with the responsibility of knowing which physicians were authorized to do certain
medical procedures in her department. One physician who was not authorized to perform a
certain procedure, continuous epidural anesthesia, began to perform that procedure on a pa-
tient and then left the hospital. Knowing that the procedure was dangerous to the mother and
the fetus, the plaintiff suggested to the doctor that he not leave the hospital. The doctor be-
came angry and both reported the incident to the hospital authorities. The plaintiff alleged
that after the incident the defendants began a course of conduct to harass, humiliate, and
degrade her good name, eventually leading to her unlawful termination. The plaintiff further
alleged that she was discharged because she refused to assist the physician in the unauthorized
procedure. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiff could
not recover for emotional distress because her claim stemmed from her discharge and she had
no claim for wrongful discharge under Texas law. Havens, 793 S.W.2d at 692. The trial court
granted the motion for summary judgment and the court of appeals reversed. Id. The court
held that the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was based upon harsh treat-
ment and rumors circulated about the plaintiff before her discharge and, therefore, was sepa-
rate and independent from her allegations of wrongful discharge. Id.
The facts in Bushell are set forth in detail in last year's survey. See Pfeiffer & Hall, supra
note 91, at 102-03. In summary, the facts that supported the plaintiff's claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress included the supervisor's ongoing sexual harassment of the
plaintiff during her employment and up to the date that the plaintiff quit her employment. The
plaintiff's damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress were affirmed by the court of
appeals, and the supreme court denied the defendants' application for a writ of error on that
issue. Bushell v. Dean, 781 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989), rev'd and remanded in part
and writ denied in part, 34 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 339, 339 (Feb. 13, 1991).
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supports a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The cases
that have addressed the issue generally conclude that while distress unavoid-
ably attends the loss of employment, discharge alone fails to justify an inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress claim because the common anxiety
associated with discharge is not the type of severe emotional distress re-
quired to be shown.94
4. Defamation and Employment Decisions
Defamation under Texas law is a defamatory statement orally communi-
cated or published without legal excuse.95 The initial question in a defama-
tion action is a question of law for the court: were the words used
reasonably capable of a defamatory meaning?96 In making this determina-
tion, the court construes the statement as a whole, in light of the surround-
ing circumstances, based upon how a person of ordinary intelligence would
perceive the entire statement.97 Only when the court determines the lan-
guage to be ambiguous, or of doubtful import, should a jury decide the state-
ment's meaning and the effect the statement has on an ordinary reader.98
94. See Nicholls v. Columbia Gas Dev., No. 89-'2418 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 1990) (employer
who does no more than exercise his right to discharge an employee has not committed outra-
geous conduct in degree and character required for liability for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress under Texas law); Austin v. Champion Int'l Corp., No. H-87-1845 (S.D. Tex.
Oct. 16, 1990) Perez v. Airco Carbon Group, Inc., No C-88-13 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 9, 1990)
(WESTLAW) (same); Castillo v. Horton Automatics, No. C-88-199 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 1990)
(same); Williams v. Sealed Power Corp., No. 4-88-254-E (N.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 1990)(WESTLAW) (same); Benavidez v. Woodforest Nat'l Bank, No. H-87-3094 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 12,
1989) (same); Yarbrough v. La Petite Academy, Inc., No. H-87-3967 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 6, 1989)
(same); Fiorenza v. First City Bank-Central, 710 F. Supp. 1104, 1105 (E.D. Tex. 1988) (same);
Laird v. Texas Commerce Bank-Odessa, 707 F. Supp. 938, 941 (W.D. Tex. 1988) (same); In re
Continental Airlines Corp., 64 B.R. 858, 861 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986) (same).
95. Ramos v. Henry C. Beck Co., 711 S.W.2d 331, 333 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no
writ).
96. Carr v. Brasher, 776 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex. 1989); Musser v. Smith Protective Serv.,
Inc., 723 S.W.2d 653, 654-55 (Tex. 1987); Baubles & Beads v. Louis Vuitton, S.A., 766 S.W.2d
377, 381 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1989, no writ).
97. Carr, 776 S.W.2d at 570; Musser, 723 S.W.2d at 655; Fitzjarrald v. Panhandle Pub-
lishing Co., 149 Tex. 87, 228 S.W.2d 499, 504 (1950).
98. Carr, 776 S.W.2d at 570; Musser, 723 S.W.2d at 655; Denton Publishing Co. v. Boyd,
460 S.W.2d 881, 884 (Tex. 1970). Frank B. Hall & Co. v. Buck, 678 S.W.2d 612 ('ex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cerL denied, 472 U.S. 1009 (1985) illustrates how
a statement that may not appear defamatory may be construed as defamatory by a jury. In
Buck a prospective new employer of Buck telephoned Hall & Co. to learn about the circum-
stances surrounding Buck's termination. One of Hall & Co.'s employees stated that "Larry
[Buck] didn't reach his production goals." When pressed for more information, Eckert de-
clined to comment, stating, "I can't go into it." The prospective employer then asked if the
company would rehire Buck, and the employee answered, "No." The prospective employer
testified that because of the company's employee's comments, he was unwilling to extend an
offer of employment. Buck sued his former employer for defamation of character alleging that
Hall & Co. employees made defamatory statements about him during the course of telephone
references with Buck's prospective employers. The jury found in favor of Buck. The company
appealed the jury determination that the alleged statements were defamatory and argued that
the words are susceptible to a non-defamatory interpretation because Buck was never explicitly
accused of any wrongdoing nor was he called anything disparaging. The court disagreed and
concluded there was evidence sufficient to show that the prospective employer understood the
statements made by the defendant's employee in a defamatory sense. Because the statements
were ambiguous, the court held that the jury was entitled to find that the company's state-
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a. The Doctrine of Self-Publication.
Generally, in the employment context, publication of defamation occurs
when an employer communicates to a third party a defamatory statement
about a former employee. The doctrine of self-publication provides that
publication occurs when an individual is compelled to publish defamatory
statements in response to inquiries of prospective employers and the former
employer should have foreseen that compulsion.99 Texas courts do not ana-
lyze the circumstances in terms of whether the facts compelled the former
employee to repeat the defamatory words; rather, Texas law focuses on the
foreseeability that the words would be communicated to a third party.100
b. Absolute Privilege.
Any communication, oral or written, uttered or published in the course of,
or in contemplation of, a judicial proceeding is absolutely privileged. 101 No
action for damages will lie for such communication, even though it is false
and published with malice. 102 The privilege also has been extended to pro-
ceedings before executive officers, boards, and commissions exercising quasi-
judicial powers. 10 3 Examples of quasi-judicial bodies include the State Bar
Grievance Committee, a grand jury, the Railroad Commission, the Phar-
macy Board, the Internal Affairs Division of the Police Department of Dal-
las, °4 and the Texas Employment Commission.105
ments were calculated to convey that Buck had been terminated because of serious
misconduct.
99. See Note, Self-Publication of Defamation and Employee Discharge, 6 THE REviEw OF
LITIGATION 313, 314 (1987). Two cases in Texas recognize the doctrine of self-publication.
See Chasewood Constr. Co. v. Rico, 696 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (reasonable to expect contractor dismissed from project for theft would be re-
quired to repeat reason to others); First State Bank v. Ake, 606 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Corpus Christi 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (reasonable to expect former bank employee discharged
for dishonesty would be required to admit same in employment interview or application for
employment).
100. Chasewood, 696 S.W.2d at 445; Ake, 606 S.W.2d at 701. The Texas courts' recogni-
tion of the doctrine of self-publication is based upon comment k of the RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 577 (1977); see Chasewood, 696 S.W.2d at 444,446. Comment k provides as
follows:
Intentional or negligent publication. There is an intent to publish defamatory
matter when the actor does an act for the purpose of communicating it to a third
person or with knowledge that it is substantially certain to be so communicated
It is not necessary, however, that the communication to a third person be inten-
tional. If a reasonable person would recognize that an act creates an unreasona-
ble risk that the defamatory matter will be communicated to a third person, the
conduct becomes a negligent communication. A negligent communication
amounts to a publication just as effectively as an intentional communication.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577 comment k (1977).
101. See James v. Brown, 637 S.W.2d 914, 916-17 (Tex. 1982).
102. See Reagan v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 140 Tex. 105, 109, 166 S.W.2d 909, 913 (1942).
103. See id. at I11, 166 S.W.2d at 912.
104. See Putter v. Anderson, 601 S.W.2d 73, 77 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
105. See Taylor v. Houston Lighting and Power Co., No. H-89-909, slip op. at 12 (S.D.
Tex. Nov. 21, 1990); Krenek v. Abel, 594 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, no
writ); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5221b-9(j) (Vernon 1987).
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a An Employer's Qualified Privilege.
Although an employer may be responsible for making a defamatory state-
ment about an employee or former employee, the employer will not be liable
if the statement is published under circumstances that make it conditionally
privileged if the privilege is not abused."' 6 Whether a qualified privilege ex-
ists is a question of law. 10 7 "A qualified privilege comprehends communica-
tions made in good faith on subject matter in which the author has an
interest or with reference to which he has an interest or with reference to
which he has a duty to perform to another person having a corresponding
interest or duty."' 08 Generally, defamatory statements by an employer
about an employee, or former employee, to a person having a common inter-
est in the matter to which the communication relates, such as a prospective
employer, are qualifiedly privileged. 1' 9
In Boze v. Branstetter 110 Uriele Boze, a lawyer in Chevron's legal depart-
ment, sued Chevron for defamation because Burton Branstetter, the regional
counsel for Chevron, called Boze "the worst rated lawyer through [Branstet-
ter's] tenure with Gulf and... now the worst rated lawyer in the Chevron
U.S.A.-Law Department."''I Relying on Houston v. Grocers Supply Co.,"12
the Fifth Circuit held that the communication was privileged because the
evaluation was not published to anyone outside Chevron or anyone in Chev-
ron who did not have a direct interest in knowing how Branstetter thought
one of the lawyers in his department was performing."13 The court held that
Branstetter, as Boze's supervisor, had a particular interest in Boze's per-
formance and that Branstetter's communication regarding Boze to Branstet-
ter's supervisors was privileged.114 The court recognized the important
public policy behind the privilege, specifically, protecting the need for free
communication of information to protect business and personal interests." s5
In the absence of evidence of malice, Chevron's statements were protected
by the qualified privilege.' 16
106. Boze v. Branstetter, 912 F.2d 801, 806 (5th Cir. 1990); Gaines v. CUNA Mut. Ins.
Soc'y, 681 F.2d 982, 986 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing Bergman v. Oshman's Sporting Goods, 594
S.W.2d 814, 816 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, no writ); Butler v. Central Bank & Trust Co.,
458 S.W.2d 510, 514-15 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1970, writ dism'd)); Houston v. Grocers
Supply Co., 625 S.W.2d 798, 800 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ); Duncantell
v. Universal Life Ins. Co., 446 S.W.2d 934, 936 (rex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1969,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
107. Boze v. Branstetter, 912 F.2d at 806 (interpreting Texas law); Grocers Supply, 625
S.W.2d at 800 (citing Oshman's Sporting Goods, 594 S.W.2d at 816); Mayfield v. Gleichert, 484
S.W.2d 619, 626 (rex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1972, no writ)).
108. Boze, 912 F.2d at 806 (quoting Grocers Supply, 625 S.W.2d at 800).
109. Ramos v. Henry C. Beck Co., 711 S.W.2d 331,335 (rex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ)
(citing Grocers Supply, 625 S.W.2d at 800); Oshman's Sponing Goods, 594 S.W.2d at 816;
Duncantell, 446 S.W.2d at 937.
110. 912 F.2d 801 (5th Cir. 1990).
111. Id. at 806.
112. 625 S.W.2d 798, 800 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ).
113. Boze, 912 F.2d at 807.
114. Id. at 806.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 807.
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An employer may lose the qualified privilege if his communication or pub-
lication is accompanied by actual malice."17 Actual malice is a term of art in
the defamation context and is separate and distinct from traditional common
law malice. I 8 Actual malice does not include ill will, spite or evil motive;
rather, it requires the making of a statement with knowledge that it is false,
or with reckless disregard of whether it is true.' 9 Reckless disregard is de-
fined as a high degree of awareness of probable falsity, for proof of which the
plaintiff must present sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the
defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publica-
tion.120 An error in judgment is not sufficient to show actual malice.' 2'
While the Texas cases adopting the doctrine of self-publication do not ad-
dress the issue of whether a qualified privilege exists in such cases, 122 deci-
sions in other jurisdictions recognizing the doctrine do recognize a qualified
privilege in the employment context.123
d. Employer's Liability for Employee's Defamatory Statements.
Statements made by a supervisor or management level employee about an-
other employee or a former employee while in the course and scope of the
discharge of his responsibilities generally will be imputed to the company. 24
An action is sustainable against the company for defamation by its employee
if the defamation is referable to the duty the employee owes to the company
and is made while in the discharge of that duty.' 25 Neither express authori-
zation, nor subsequent ratification by the company, is necessary in order to
117. Dixon v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 607 S.W.2d 240, 242 (Tex. 1980); Dun & Brad-
street, Inc. v. O'Neil, 456 S.W.2d 896, 898 (Tex. 1970); Marathon Oil Co. v. Salazar, 682
S.W.2d 624, 631 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Grocers Supply, 625
S.W.2d at 801; Bridges v. Farmer, 483 S.W.2d 939, 944 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972, no
writ).
118. Casso v. Brand, 776 S.W.2d 551, 558 (Tex. 1989); see Cart v. Brasher, 776 S.W.2d at
571.
119. Carr, 776 S.W.2d at 571 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 328
(1974)).
120. Id. (citing St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968); Casso, 776 S.W.2d at
558).
121. Id.
122. See infra note 99.
123. See, e.g., Steinbach v. Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 728 F. Supp. 1389 (D. Minn.
1989); Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co., 759 P.2d 1336 (Colo. 1988); Elmore v. Shell Oil Co.,
733 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 389 N.W.2d 876
(Minn. 1986). In Lewis the Minnesota Supreme Court correctly acknowledged the reason for
allowing the qualified privilege in self-publication cases:
Where an employer would be entitled to a privilege if it had actually published
the statement, it makes little sense to deny the privilege where the identical com-
munication is made to identical third parties with the only difference being the
mode of publication. Finally, recognition of a qualified privilege seems to be the
only effective means of addressing the concern that every time an employer
states the reason for discharging an employee it will subject itself to potential
liability for defamation.
Id. at 889-90.
124. Ryder Truck Rentals v. Latham, 593 S.W.2d 334, 337 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1980,
writ ref'd. n.r.e.).
125. Wagner v. Caprock Beef Packers Co., 540 S.W.2d 303, 304 (Tex. 1976); Texam Oil
Corp. v. Poynor, 436 S.W.2d 129, 130 (Tex. 1968); Frank B. Hall & Co. v. Buck, 678 S.W.2d
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establish liability. 126 However, a company will not be liable for acts of an
employee which are not referable to the company's business and unauthor-
ized by the company. 127 In Muldrow v. Exxon Co., USA. 128 a former em-
ployee, Dennis Muldrow, sued Exxon for slander because Exxon employees
repeated to an associate of Muldrow's, Ralph Cooper, that Muldrow had
been discharged for misappropriating Exxon property. The district court
found that the Exxon employees were speaking "as friends of Cooper's, that
they did not speak or purport to speak for Exxon, and that they lacked real
or apparent authority to make statements for Exxon regarding the circum-
stances of Muldrow's termination." 1 29 The Fifth Circuit alfirmed the find-
ing and observed that the employees' statements were made in the context of
their friendship with Cooper and that their responsibilities did not extend to
the issue of Muldrow's termination. 130 Moreover, no one understood that
the employees were speaking for Exxon when they discussed Muldrow's ter-
mination with Cooper.131 Muldrow also complained about another Exxon
employee who allegedly discussed the reason for Muldrow's termination
with other Exxon employees. The Fifth Circuit held that this employee dis-
cussed Muldrow's termination in his personal capacity and that Exxon was
not liable for that publication. 132
5. Obligation of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Although individuals continue to urge the courts to adopt an implied con-
tractual covenant or a tortious duty of good faith and fair dealing in the
employer-employee relationship, the Texas Supreme Court133 and the courts
of appeals 134 refuse to recognize such an obligation. While most employ-
612, 627 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cerL denied, 472 U.S. 1009
(1985).
126. Texam Oil Corp., 436 S.W.2d at 130; Frank B. Hall, 678 S.W.2d at 627.
127. Muldrow v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., No. 89-2528 (5th Cir. Aug. 13, 1990) (interpreting
Texas law) (unpublished); Horton v. Robinson, 776 S.W.2d 260, 267 (Tex. App.-El Paso
1989, no writ).
128. No. 89-2528 (5th Cir. Aug. 13, 1990).
129. Id. slip op. at 3.
130. Id. slip op. at 4.
131. Id.
132. Id. slip op. at 5-6.
133. See Winters v. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 795 S.W.2d 723, 724 n.2 (Tex.
1990); McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 779 S.W.2d 69, 73-74, 75 (Tex. 1989), rev'd, 111 S.
Ct. 478, 112 L. Ed. 2d 474 (1990); see also Caton v. Leach Corp., 896 F.2d 939, 948-49 (5th
Cir. 1990) (Texas courts do not recognize duty of good faith and fair dealing in employment
relationship); Scott v. Vetco Gray, Inc., No. 89-1839 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 1990) (claim for
breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing in employment contract not cognizable in
Texas); Guzman v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., No. SA-88-CA-533 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 16, 1990)
(same); Nicholls v. Columbia Gas Dev., No. 89-2418 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 1990) (Texas courts
do not recognize claim for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in employ-
ment contract); Rodriguez v. Benson Properties, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 275, 276-77 (W.D. Tex.
1989) (Texas courts do not recognize duty of good faith and fair dealing in employment rela-
tionship); Bowser v. McDonald's Corp., 714 F. Supp. 839 (S.D. Tex. 1989) (same).
134. Winograd v. Willis, 789 S.W.2d 307, 312 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ
denied) (neither legislature nor supreme court have recognized implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing in employment relationship); Hicks v.. Baylor Univ. Medical Center, 789
S.W.2d 299, 303-04 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied) (following supreme court's express
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ment practitioners thought that the issue in McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand
Co. 135 was whether the duty of good faith and fair dealing 136 should be im-
posed on the employer-employee relationship, 137 the court failed to address
the issue. However, in two dissenting opinions, Chief Justice Phillips and
Justices Gonzalez, Cook, and Hecht expressed the view that such a duty
should not be imposed on the employment relationship.138 A majority of the
supreme court subsequently noted in Winters v. Houston Chronicle Publish-
ing Co. 139 that it had rejected an opportunity to imply a duty of good faith
and fair dealing in the employment relationship.140 The majority suggested
that if Winters had pressed the issue,' 4 1 the court was prepared to conclude
that no duty of good faith and fair dealing existed in the employer-employee
relationship. 1 42 Since Justice Spears, a Democrat and a member of the Mc-
Clendon majority, retired and has been replaced by Justice Cornyn, a Re-
publican, a clear majority of the court1 43 may reject the implied covenant or
duty of good faith and fair dealing in the employment relationship when that
issue is next presented to the court. As Justice Mauzy observed in another
rejection of invitation to recognize implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in employ-
ment relationship); Lumpkin v. H & C Communications, Inc., 755 S.W.2d 538, 540 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied) (rejecting implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing in employment relationship). In Lumpkin the sole point of error on appeal to the
court was whether an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is inherent in the em-
ployer-employee relationship. Id. The court of appeals overruled Lumpkin's point of error,
id. at 539-40, and Lumpkin appealed the issue to the supreme court, 32 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 11, 13
(Oct. 15, 1988). Lumpkin's application for a writ of error had been pending before the
supreme court for approximately one year when the court decided McClendon. Curiously, the
supreme court failed to grant Lumpkin's application when it granted McClendon's application
and consolidate the cases. Nevertheless, shortly after McClendon, the court denied Lumpkin's
application for a writ of error. 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. . 114 (Dec. 9, 1989).
135. McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 779 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. 1989), rev'd, Ill S. Ct. 478,
112 L. Ed. 2d 474 (1990).
136. Interestingly, while the case was pending before the supreme court, the issue trans-
formed from a covenant (., contract damages) to a duty (Le, tort damages) issue. See id. at
70 n. 1. The "duty" of good faith and fair dealing was never raised by the court of appeals or
the parties to the case. Moreover, the issue specifically raised by McClendon and addressed by
the court of appeals and the issue raised by McClendon in his application for a writ of error
and opposed by Ingersoll-Rand was whether a covenant of good faith and fair dealing should
be implied in all employment contracts. See McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 757 S.W.2d
816, 819-20 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 779 S.W.2d 69
(Tex. 1989), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 478, 112 L.Ed.2d 474 (1990); Petitioner's Application for a Writ
of Error, Point of Error No. 4, at 17-40; Respondent's Brief in Response to Petitioner's Appli-
cation for Writ of Error at 20-27.
137. The court granted McClendon's application for a writ of error on the issue of whether
a covenant of good faith and fair dealing should be applied to the employment relationship. 32
Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 227 (Feb. 25, 1989). In a 5-4 decision the court dodged the issue entirely and
reversed the summary judgment in favor of the employer by carving out another exception to
the employment-at-will doctrine. 779 S.W.2d at 70-71. See infra text accompanying notes
302-25.
138. 779 S.W.2d at 73-74, 75.
139. 795 S.W.2d 723 (Tex. 1990).
140. Id. at 724.
141. Winters abandoned the issue at oral argument. Id. at 724 n.2.
142. Id.
143. Chief Justice Phillips retained his seat by defeating Justice Mauzy, who will remain on
the court since his term has not expired. Justice Ray, a Democrat and a member of the major-
ity in McClendon who has also retired, has been replaced by Justice Gammage, a Democrat.
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case, "the makeup of this court has changed." 144
B. Statutory Claims
1. Claims Under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act
In Central Power & Light Co. v. Caballero 145 Caballero was employed by
Central Power & Light Co. (CPL) as a lineman. In 1976 he began exper-
iencing trouble with his back and he sought treatment on his own volition in
Mexico. Approximately ten years later, Caballero asked for time off to seek
treatment from a chiropractor for his back problems. Subsequently, Cabal-
lero requested that he be exempted from climbing poles because of his back
problems. As a result of this request and other factors, CPL asked Caballero
to undergo a physical examination, which he did. Following the exam, the
doctor told Caballero that he did not believe Caballero was able to work as a
lineman any longer. Caballero was offered an office manager's job by CPL,
but he refused and quit his job.146 Caballero sued CPL for discrimination
based upon his handicap in violation of the Texas Commission on Human
Rights Acts (TCHRA).147 In response to five jury questions, the jury found
that Caballero had a handicap, that the handicap did not impair his ability
to perform the duties of a lineman, that the decision to remove Caballero as
a lineman was not justified by business necessity, that Caballero had $33,000
loss of earnings in the past and $200,000 loss of earning capacity in the fu-
ture, and, furthermore, the jury awarded Caballero attorney's fees. 148 CPL
appealed and argued that the trial court erred on three counts: 1) in submit-
ting Caballero's claim to a jury because the TCHRA requires the trial court
to proceed in equity; 2) in rendering judgment for damages in an equitable
proceeding; and 3) in rendering judgment for damages where Caballero
failed to prove non-compliance with a court order. 49 The court of appeals
agreed with CPL and reversed and remanded the case.
The court observed that Caballero brought his suit solely on the basis of
violations of the TCHRA and that he is accordingly limited to the relief
provided by the Act. 150 The court held that relief under the TCHRA is to
be obtained in an equitable proceeding in the courts, following the adminis-
trative decision of the Texas Commission orf Human Rights (TCHR).151
144. Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349, 362 (rex. 1987).
145. No. 04-90-00112-CV (Tex. App.-San Antonio Dec. 12, 1990, n.w.h.).
146. After Caballero quit working, he was paid five months' salary, $11,500, at which time
he went on long-term diability and received $1,400 per month from July, 1987 until October,
1989, when trial began. One month before trial began, Caballero began a job teaching school
earning either $650 or $1,300 per month, the record was not clear. Id. slip op. at 2-3.
147. Caballero filed his law suit before the TCHRA was amended to replace the term
"handicap" with the term "disability"; therefore, the court held that the pre-amendment
TCHRA applied to Caballero's claim. Id. slip op. at 6-7.
148. Id. slip op. at 3.
149. Id. slip op. at 7.
150. Id. slip op. at 12.
151. Id. "If the court finds that the respondent has engaged in an unlawful employment
practice as alleged in the complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in an
unlawful employment practice and order such additional equitable relief as may be appropri-
ate." TEX. Rnv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k, § 7.01(c) (Vernon 1987).
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The court noted that Caballero failed to obtain an injunction against CPL
from engaging in any unlawful employment practice.1 52 The court also
stated that Caballero failed to prove that CPL had not complied with an
order of the court issued in a civil action brought under the TCHRA. 53 As
a result of the trial court's action, CPL was deprived of a hearing to deter-
mine whether an injunction was appropriate as required by section 7.01(c)
and deprived of a hearing to determine whether it had failed to comply with
an order of the court as required by section 7.01(g) prior to submitting any
factual issues to the jury.15 4 The court also held that award of damages for
loss of earnings in the past and in the future violated the TCHRA. 55 The
loss of earnings in the past was not reduced by the amount of "interim earn-
ings and unemployment compensation benefits" as set forth in the
TCHRA.1 56 The court noted that if Caballero's award of damages for loss
of past earnings were reduced by his interim earnings as required, it would
entirely eliminate his back pay award.157 Further, the award of loss of fu-
ture earnings is not an element of damages specified in the TCHRA. 5 8 The
court also agreed with CPL's argument that the submission of the questions
to the jury regarding loss of past and future earnings constituted reversible
error because the TCHRA does not authorize the submission of such issues
to the jury.159 Finally, the court found that the jury was not authorized to
award attorney's fees because the TCHRA specifically provides that "the
court in its discretion may allow the prevailing party... a reasonable attor-
ney's fee as part of the costs."' 16 Accordingly, the judgment of the trial
court was reversed.
In Finney v. Baylor Medical Center Grapevine1 61 a hospital employed
Catherine Finney as a marketing director for approximately two years. The
employee had received no warnings or reprimands concerning her job per-
formance. During her employment, Finney was diagnosed as suffering from
manic depression and was hospitalized for two weeks so that her doctor
152. Id. slip op. at 13.
153. Id.
In any case in which an employer, employment agency, or labor organization
fails to comply with an order of a court issued in a civil action brought under
this article, a party to the action or the commission, on the written request of a
person aggrieved by the failure, may commence proceedings to compel compli-
ance with the order.
TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art 5221k, § 7.01(g) (Vernon 1987).
154. Id. slip op. at 15, 17.
155. Id. slip op. at 19.
156. Id. "[I]nterim earnings and unemployment compensation benefits received shall oper-
ate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable." TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k,
§ 7.01(d)(l) (Vernon 1987). The amendment to § 7.01(d)(1) now provides for the deduction of
workers' compensation benefits from any back pay award. Id. § 7.01(d)(1) (Vernon Supp.
1991).
157. Id. slip op. at 20-21.
158. Id. slip op. at 19.
159. Id. slip op. at 19-20. Under section 7.01 of the TCHRA, loss of earnings in the past or
back pay is "additional equitable relief" that may be awarded by the court pursuant to section
7.01(c).
160. Id. slip op at. 20.
161. 792 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, writ denied).
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could adjust her medication. The hospital was unaware of her condition
until Finney was hospitalized. Although Finney received a medical release
from her doctor stating that she could return to work, the hospital dis-
charged her. Finney filed suit charging the hospital with intentional dis-
crimination against her based on her handicap1 62 in violation of TCHRA.
The hospital filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that as a matter
of law Finney's manic depression was not a handicap as contemplated under
TCHRA. Also, the hospital argued that the employee's condition was emo-
tional, rather than physical or mental, and that TCHRA addresses physical
and mental conditions without referring to emotional conditions; therefore,
the legislature intended to exclude emotional conditions from the Act.
The trial court granted the employer's motion for summary judgment, and
the court of appeals reversed. The court of appeals held that the proper
categorization of the employee's condition, Le., mental, physical or emo-
tional, was not conclusively established by the record; therefore, the proper
categorization of Finney's condition remained undecided. 163 The court also
held that whether Finney's manic depression is a handicap under the Act is
a fact question that must be decided by the factfinder. 1"
In Chiari v. City of League City 165 Antonio Chiari was a construction
inspector for League City and he was responsible for approving construction
plans and verifying that work was completed properly. Approximately one-
half of Chiari's work involved on-site inspection of construction projects. In
1981 Chiari was diagnosed with Parkinson's disease, a degenerative nerve
disorder. By 1987, Chiari began having difficulty walking and he was seen
stumbling and falling. Two neurosurgeons concluded that Chiari could no
longer perform his job as a construction inspector and one neurologist con-
cluded that he could continue his job as long as he did not climb. The city
reviewed the medical reports and concluded that Chiari's physical limita-
tions prevented him from continuing his job. The city attempted to restruc-
ture his job to accommodate his disease, but was unable to find a solution
and, therefore, discharged Chiari. Chiari sued the city for, among other
things, discrimination based upon his disability in violation of the TCHRA
and the federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973.166 The district court granted the
city's motion for summary judgment, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 67 Cit-
ing the prohibition against discharging an employee because of a disability,
the court observed that the phrase "because of disability" in section 5.01
"refers to discrimination because of or on the basis of a physical or mental
162. In TCHRA the term "disability" replaces the term "handicap." TEx. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 5221k, § 2.01(4) (Vernon Supp. 1991). "Disability" is defined as a "mental or
physical impairment that substantially limits at least one major life activity or a record of such
a mental or physical impairm.-it." Id. The term "disability" will probably be construed more
broadly than the term "handi-ap". See Pfeiffer & Hall, supra note 91, at 126.
163. 792 S.W.2d at 860.
164. Id. at 862 (citing Chevron Corp. v. Redmon, 745 S.W.2d 314, 318 (Tex. 1987) (ques-
tion of whether person is handicapped is question of fact)).
165. 920 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1991).
166. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (West Supp. 1990).
167. 920 F.2d at 313.
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condition that does not impair an individual's ability to reasonably perform
a job." 168 The court stated that the definition is akin to the "otherwise quali-
fied" requirement under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 169 The court
concluded that the city demonstrated that Chiari could not perform the es-
sential functions of his job and that it could not reasonably accommodate
Chiari's disability. 170 Because Chiari failed to produce any evidence that he
could perform his duties as a construction inspector despite his disability,
the court affirmed the summary judgment.171
In Bushell v. Dean 172 Mary Dean was awarded, inter alia, damages for
sexual harassment and attorney's fees under TCHRA. 17 3 The court of ap-
peals reversed that part of the judgment because the trial court allowed
Dean's expert to testify as to the profile of a sexual harasser. During trial,
Dean's expert described a typical sexual harasser as a married man who is
the victim's supervisor and has known the victim for at least six months.
Through other witnesses, Dean showed that the expert's profile constituted
an accurate description of Bushell.
Syndex argued on appeal that the admission of the profile testimony was
error for three reasons: first, such evidence was irrelevant; second, it was
inadmissible character evidence; and, third, its probative value was substan-
tially outweighed by unfair prejudice. The court of appeals sustained all
three points of error. 174 Noting that a fair trial requires each dispute to be
determined on its own facts, the court held that profile testimony was not
relevant as it necessarily involved facts from other, similar, cases. 175 Ac-
cordingly, the court held that the conduct of one individual under certain
circumstances is never a safe criterion by which to judge the behavior of
another individual. 176 Consequently, the profile testimony was irrelevant
and, thus, inadmissible. 177
The court also held that the probative value of the profile testimony was
low because it did not involve any facts about Bushell or his relationship
with Dean. 78 On the other hand, the danger of prejudicing, confusing or
misleading the jury with the proffle testimony was high, since it was
presented as expert testimony and evidence of similar situations is highly
persuasive in nature.179 Finally, the court observed that the profile testi-
168. 920 F.2d at 319 (quoting TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k, § 5.01(1) (Vernon
1991)).
169. Id. (citing Elstner v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 659 F.Supp. 1328, 1346 (S.D. Tex.
1987), aff'd, 863 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1988)).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. 34 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 339 (Feb. 13, 1991).
173. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1991).
174. 781 S.W.2d 652, 657 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989), rev'd and remanded in part and writ
denied in part, 34 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 339 (Feb. 13, 1991).
175. Id. at 656.
176. Id. at 655 (citing P. TAYLOR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE As ADMINIS-
TERED IN ENGLAND AND IRELAND (8th ed. 1887)).
177. Id. (citing TEX. R. CIv. EVID. 402).
178. Id. at 656.
179. Id.
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mony, as character evidence, depended on the following logic: sexual ha-
rassers possess particular personality traits; Bushell possessed those traits;
Bushell, therefore, probably committed sexual harassment.180
The court found that the use of profile testimony to prove the character of
Bushell through the character of third-parties was error.,,' More impor-
tantly, however, the court held that the error in admitting the profile testi-
mony constituted reversible error.182 The court found the proof of sexual
harassment to be so evenly divided that the cogent expert testimony was
probably very persuasive to the jury.18 3 Unfortunately for the employer,
Syndex and Bushell did not preserve the error with respect to the admission
of the testimony by objecting when it was offered.'84 Despite the supreme
court's technical reversal on the issue of the admissibility of the proffle testi-
mony offered in Bushell, it appears that the court of appeals' analysis of the
profile testimony is sound and that such evidence would be inadmissible in a
sexual harassment case.
In Lakeway Land Co. v. Kizer'" Milton Kizer began working for the
Lakeway Resort in 1974, maintaining golf carts. By 1982, Lakeway had
three golf courses and Kizer was supervising to some degree the golf cart
maintenance operations at each course. In 1982, Lakeway placed another
employee, David McManus, in charge of the golf courses and he decentral-
ized the golf cart operations. McManus put Kizer in charge of one of the
three facilities and froze Kizer's salary indefinitely. He placed Leroy Haak
in charge of the second course, and Roger Rodeman in charge of the third
course. McManus also was not satisfied with certain areas of Kizer's
performance.
Two years later, McManus placed all three golf cart operations under the
supervision of Rodeman. He demoted Kizer and Haak to cartman, a job
involving washing and preparing the carts. Their salaries were reduced ac-
cordingly. Both Kizer and Haak were substantially over forty years old.
Rodeman was in his twenties. Additionally, McManus placed Rodeman in
charge of golf cart sales, thereby taking potential sales commissions away
from Kizer. Although the decision to reorganize was made in 1983, Lake-
way did not inform Kizer of his demotion until May of 1984 when he re-
turned from his vacation to find Rodeman sitting at his desk. Kizer resigned
and sued Lakeway for age discrimination under TCHRA. The jury found
that Lakeway willfully discriminated against Kizer because of his age and
awarded him $78,660 in backpay.
Lakeway argued that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to
support the jury's finding of age discrimination. In connection with the is-
sue, the trial court instructed the jury that they first must consider whether
180. Id.
181. Id. at 656 n.6 (citing C. MCCORMICK & R. RAY, TExAs LAW OF EVIDENCE CIVIL
AND CRIMINAL § 676 (1937)).
182. Id. at 657.
183. Id.
184. 34 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 339 (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 52(a)).
185. 796 S.W.2d 820 (Tex.App.-Austin 1990, no writ).
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Kizer had proved a prima facie case of age discrimination. I8 6 The court
instructed the jury to consider the following factors: 1) Kizer was between
the ages of forty and seventy years old; 2) an adverse employment decision
was made that affected Kizer; and, 3) the position was given to a person
under the age of forty.18 7 The court further instructed the jury that if they
found that Kizer had established a prima facie case, they should determine
whether Lakeway had stated a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the
employment decision.188 If the jury found that Lakeway stated a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason, they were to determine whether the reason
profered was a pretext for age discrimination. If the jury determined that
Lakeway failed to state a legitimate business reason, or if it stated a legiti-
mate reason that was simply a pretext for age discrimination, the jury was
instructed to conclude that Kizer was discriminated against because of his
age. While Lakeway admitted that Kizer established a prima facie case of
age discrimination, Lakeway argued that it established a nondiscriminatory
reason for Kizer's demotion and that the reason offered was not a pretext for
age discrimination. The court of appeals disagreed. The court observed that
before McManus' arrival at the resort, Kizer received a series of good em-
ployment evaluations and merit raises and that Kizer and Haak were quality
employees.' 89 Additionally, one witness testified that after Rodeman took
over as cart maintenance supervisor for all three courses, he overhead
Rodeman say, "we are going to have to do away with these... old and
senile" men.' 90 Haak was fired soon after the statement was made. More-
over, the evidence showed that McManus terminated or demoted five em-
ployees who were over the age of forty and that they were replaced by men
substantially under the age of forty. The court accordingly overruled Lake-
way's challenge to the finding of age discrimination. 191
Lakeway also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
jury's finding that Lakeway's discrimination against Kizer was willful. The
jury was instructed that a violation is willful if the employer either knew, or
showed reckless disregard as to, whether its conduct was prohibited by law;
that a violation is willful if it is done voluntarily, deliberately, and intention-
ally and not by accident, inadvertence, or ordinary negligence; and that it
was not necessary to find direct evidence of intent to discriminate in order to
find that the violation was willful. The evidence reflected that Lakeway
hired a consulting accountant to perform a management study of the gulf
cart operations, and that the accountant talked to several employees, but did
not talk to Kizer or Haak who possessed the most experience in the area.
Further, the consolidation of the cart operations and Kizer's demotion were
considered for almost a year before Kizer was told of the demotion on the
eve of his long-planned vacation. As a result, the court of appeals held that
186. Id. at 822.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 822-23.
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the record supported the jury's finding of willful discrimination. 192
Lakeway argued that the evidence did not support the back pay award
because Kizer could have mitigated any damages, but he did not attempt to
obtain other employment. The trial court instructed the jury that Kizer was
entitled to the amount he would have earned, absent discrimination, through
the time of trial, unless the jury determined that Kizer failed to mitigate his
damages. 193 The court further instructed the jury that Kizer had the duty to
mitigate his damages by seeking other employment, but he was not required
to accept employment that was not of the same or similar type or that did
not have comparable terms and benefits of employment to those of Lake-
way. 194 The court of appeals observed that a defendant claiming mitigation
of damages has the burden not only to prove lack of diligence on the part of
the plaintiff in seeking alternative employment, but also to prove the amount
by which damages were increased by such failure to mitigate. 195 The evi-
dence reflected that despite numerous contacts in the golfing community,
Kizer was unable to secure a supervisory position with a golf course. Be-
cause Lakeway did not offer any affirmative evidence to support its argument
that Kizer did not look for a job, the court affirmed the jury's finding of back
pay damages. 196
Lakeway argued that the court's instruction to the jury that "discrimina-
tion.., is a fact which you may infer from the existence of other facts," 197
duplicated the circumstantial evidence instruction also provided in the jury
charge, thereby indicating to the jury that a discrimination case could be
decided on a lesser quantity of evidence. The court of appeals disagreed, and
held that the instruction was a carefully worded directive that attempted to
clarify the unique factfinding analysis in an age discrimination case.198
Among other evidentiary objections, 199 Lakeway argued that the trial
court erred in not allowing it to show that Kizer received a Marine Corps
pension in excess of $1,300 per month. The court of appeals noted that
Lakeway did not explain how the jury would have been aided by the knowl-
edge of the specific dollar amount of the pension since the jury was in-
192. Id. at 824.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. (citing Cocke v. White, 697 S.W.2d 739, 744 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1985,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Hardison v. Beard, 430 S.W.2d 53, 57 (Tex. Civ. App.-Da~las 1968, writ
ref'd n.r.e.)).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 826.
198. Id.
199. Lakeway complained that the trial court erred in not allowing it to show its losses
during the years of its laying off employees; and in sustaining the objection to Lakeway's ques-
tion asking if Kizer thought he was not selected as cart maintenance supervisor because of his
age; and in sustaining Kizer's objection to Lakeway's question asking Kizer whether he
thought McManus' getting along with Rodeman better than with Kizer was a valid reason for
choosing Rodeman; and in not allowing appellant to introduce any evidence concerning em-
ployee complaints against Kizer; and in sustaining Kizer's objection to Lakeway's question
asking Kizer how he had spent his time since he resigned from his job. Id. at 826-27. How-
ever, Lakeway failed to preserve error as to these evidentiary complaints. Id.
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structed that Kizer was entitled to his full lost wages less the mitigation.2'0
Lakeway also argued that since the amount of the pension directly related to
Kizer's willingness to seek new employment, the jury should have been able
to consider the amount of pension in determining whether Kizer mitigated
his damages. The court of appeals disagreed, and held that the argument,
taken to its logical conclusion, would compel the conclusion that the amount
of his pension should have precluded Kizer from suing Lakeway for discrim-
ination because he might have been indifferent as to whether he was em-
ployed by Lakeway in the first place.201
In Pope v. MCI Telecommunications Corp. 20 2 the federal district court ad-
dressed a procedural question under TCHRA. In Pope MCI filed a motion
for summary judgment with respect to Pope's claim under TCHRA of une-
qual compensation and racial harassment because Pope failed to file her suit
under article 5221k within the time prescribed by the Act.203 TCHRA pro-
vides that the suit must be brought within sixty days following receipt of
notice of the right to file civil action. The notice was issued on April 8, 1987.
Pope filed her suit in state court on June 8, her first amended petition on July
8, and MCI removed the case to federal court on August 3. The court,
however, did not address the sixty-day filing issue because Pope's claims
were time barred for a different reason. Pope filed her charge of discrimina-
tion on June 6, 1986, and filed her petition in state court on June 8, 1987.
Because section 7.01(a) of TCHRA requires that a suit be filed within one
year of the date of the filing of the charge of discrimination, Pope's suit was
barred for failure to fie within the one year period. 2°4
The court also granted MCI's motion on Pope's claim of denial of promo-
tion under TCHRA. 205 Pope was denied a promotion on January 11, 1989
and did not file a charge concerning this claim until August 16, 1989, ap-
proximately 217 days after the discriminatory event. Although section
6.01(a) of TCHRA requires that the complaint be fied within 180 days of
the date of the alleged unlawful employment practice, Pope argued that the
300-day filing period for claims under Title VII206 should apply. The court
held that the 300-day time period applied only to charges filed with the
EEOC under Title VII.207 Because Pope's claim was filed under TCHRA
rather than Title VII, Pope's denial of promotion claim was time barred. 208
This same reasoning formed the basis of the court's decision in Nicholls v.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 828.
202. No. H-87-2456 (S.D. Tex. June 8, 1990).
203. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k § 7.01(a) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
204. Pope, slip op. at 6 (citing Green v. Aluminum Co. of Amer., 760 S.W.2d 378, 380
(Tex. App.-Austin 1988, no writ)).
205. Id. slip op. at 7.
206. See Urrutia v. Valero Energy Corp., 841 F.2d 123, 125 (5th Cir. 1988) (300-day filing
period for filing with EEOC available whether or not proceedings are timely instituted under
state or local law) cert. denied, 488 U.S. 829 (1988); see also Pfeiffer & Hall, supra note 91, at
107-08.
207. Pope, slip op. at 7.
208. Id.
(V/ol. 45
EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW
Columbia Gas Development.2C9 In Nicholls the district court held that Patri-
cia Nicholls' claim under TCHRA was barred because she failed to file her
charge of discrimination with the TCHR within 180 days after the discharge
of which she complained. 210 Nicholls' argument that she should be permit-
ted to take advantage of the 300-day filing period under Title VII also was
rejected.21"
In Austin v. Champion International Corp.212 the plaintiffs, former em-
ployees of Champion International Corporation, alleged that Champion and
its successor engaged in a scheme to discriminate against them on the basis
of age in violation of TCHRA and the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act by removing them, and other similarly situated employees, from Cham-
pion's workforce. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment and
urged, among other things, that the plaintiffs' claims under TCHRA should
be dismissed because the plaintiffs had either not ified, or not timely ified, for
the state administrative remedies as required by the TCHRA. The plaintiffs
responded that the initial complaint filed with the TCHR by Austin and
Kennedy contained class language that would permit the TCHR to investi-
gate on behalf of the other plaintiffs. The complaints filed by Austin and
Kennedy, however, stated that the defendants discriminated against other
named employees, but it did not state either that Austin or Kennedy was
making the complaint on behalf of these other named persons, that they
were acting as agents for these persons, or that they had authority to act on
their behalf. Therefore, no evidence existed that Kennedy or Austin acted as
agents for the other plaintiffs, or that all class members effectively filed with
the TCHR in a timely manner. The court therefore dismissed the class
members' claims.213 Consequently, the court determined whether each indi-
vidual plaintiff had filed in a timely fashion. The court dismissed the com-
plaints of plaintiffs Wiggins and Rankins for failure to file charges with the
TCHR.214 The court also dismissed the complaints of plaintiffs Harrell,
Oglethorpe and Wilson because they failed to file with TCHR their charge of
discrimination within 180 days of the date of the discriminatory action.2 "5
Finally, the court dismissed the complaints of Austin and Kennedy because
they failed to file their complaints within sixty days of receipt of their right
209. No. 89-2418 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 1990).
210. Id. slip op. at 1-3; see Diaz v. Gulf Coast Legal Foundation, No. H-88-0512 (S.D. Tex.
Nov. 8, 1990) (failure to file complaint with TCHR within 180 days required that claims under
the TCHRA be dismissed even though complaint was filed with the EEOC).
211. Pope, slip op. at 2-3 (distinguishing Urrutia v. Valero Energy Corp., 841 F.2d 123 (5th
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 829 (1988)).
212. No. H-87-1845 (S.D. Tex. October 16, 1990).
213. Id. slip op. at 11.
214. Id. slip op. at 13 (citing Schroeder v. Texas Iron Works, Inc., 769 S.W.2d 625, 628
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, writ granted) (filing complaint with TCHR a prerequisite to
filing a lawsuit)).
215. Id. slip op. at 13-14 (citing TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k, § 6.01(a) (Vernon




to sue notice from TCHR.216
2 Claims Under TEXAS REVISED CIVIL STATUTES ARTICLE 8307c
In International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc 2 17 Robert Sullivent filed
suit against his former employer, Johnson Controls, for wrongful discharge
under article 8307c of the Workers' Compensation Act. The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of the employer 218 and Sullivent ap-
pealed. Meanwhile, Sullivent's union initiated a grievance arbitration with
the company to determine whether Sullivent's discharge constituted a
breach of the collective bargaining agreement between the company and the
union. The final arbitration award was issued in favor of the company. The
company then filed a motion to dismiss Sullivent's appeal alleging that the
arbitration decision preempted Sullivent's article 8307c action.
The court of appeals granted the motion and dismissed the appeal. 2 19 Re-
lying on Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc. 220 and Ruiz v. Miller
Curtain Co.,221 the supreme court reversed the court of appeals and rein-
stated the appeal. 222 The supreme court held that Lingle provides that state
causes of action regarding labor disputes are permissible if they do not in-
volve the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement, which is an
area exclusively for the federal courts.223 The court also observed that in
Ruiz the court had previously held that a cause of action under article 8307c
is not preempted by the National Labor Relations Act.224 Since the article
8307c action was not preempted, and did not involve an interpretation of a
collective bargaining agreement, the supreme court reversed the judgment of
the court of appeals and ordered the appeal reinstated. 225
In Paragon Hotel Corp. v. Ramirez226 Lorenzo Ramirez brought suit for
damages for wrongful termination of his employment by the El Paso Airport
Hilton. While working for the hotel, Ramirez suffered a compensable back
injury which caused him to lose work time sporadically for approximately
nine months. Ramirez also received a compensable injury to his eye during
this time, but the injury did not cause a loss of work time. Toward the end
of this nine month period, Ramirez failed to report to work on two occasions
because of his back pain. Ramirez, however, had notes from his treating
physician explaining the situation. On the second occasion, Ramirez was
confined to bed. During that time he received a certified letter from the
216. Id. slip op. at 14 (citing TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k § 7.01(a) (Vernon
Supp. 1991); Green, 760 S.W.2d at 380).
217. 786 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. 1990).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 265.
220. 486 U.S. 399 (1988).
221. 702 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1004 (1987).
222. Johnson Controls, 786 S.W.2d at 266.
223. Id. at 265.
224. Id. For a discussion of Ruiz v. Miller Curtain Co., see Pfeiffer & Hall, supra note 91,
at 110-14.
225. Id. at 266.
226. 783 S.W.2d 654 (rex. App.-El Paso 1990, writ denied).
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hotel, which was translated from English to Spanish by his wife, informing
him of his discharge. In addition to having no other income, Ramirez' wife
was eight months pregnant at the time. The jury awarded to Ramirez
$3,610 for past lost wages, $100,000 for past mental anguish, $62,400 for
future lost wages, $200,000 for future mental anguish, and $200,000 in ex-
emplary damages. On appeal, the hotel challenged the legal and factual suf-
ficiency of the evidence to support all of the jury's findings.
The court of appeals held that the evidence supported the jury's finding of
a causal link between Ramirez' termination and the filing of his claim.227
The court identified four factors in concluding that sufficient evidence sup-
ported the finding of a causal link between the filing of the claim and the
discharge: 1) those making the decision to discharge Ramirez were aware of
his compensation claim; 2) those making the decision to discharge Ramirez
expressed a negative attitude toward Ramirez' injured condition; 3) the com-
pany failed to adhere to established company policies with regard to progres-
sive disciplinary action; and 4) the company discriminated in its treatment of
Ramirez in comparison to other employees allegedly guilty of similar infrac-
tions.228 Observing that the evidence may be circumstantial and not direct,
the court held that the jury was entitled to find that the filing of the claim
was a reason for Ramirez' discharge based on these four factors.229
With respect to Ramirez' award for past mental anguish, the court found
that the evidence was sufficient to establish that the mental anguish suffered
was more than mere disappointment. 230 The court, however, did find that
no evidence supported the jury's award for future mental anguish, and re-
versed and rendered judgment for the hotel on that issue.231 The court held
that Ramirez' mere uncertainty of continued employment did not reach the
minimum threshold of damages for future mental anguish.232 The court also
reversed, but remanded for a new trial, the jury's award for lost future
wages.233 The court found that while Ramirez presented some evidence of
future lost wages, it left the jury with too much conjecture to calculate future
lost wages with reasonable certainty.234 Finally, the court affirmed the ex-
emplary damage award, finding ample evidence that the hotel acted willfully
or maliciously and that the award was not so disproportionate as to indicate
passion, prejudice or disregard of the evidence.235
Interestingly, the hotel advanced the public policy argument that the ex-
cessive size of the judgment should be reversed because it would have a chil-
227. Id. at 658.
228. Id. These four factors may be useful in analyzing whether there is circumstantial
evidence to support a causal link between the filing of a workers' compensation claim and a
subsequent discharge.
229. Id. at 658-60.
230. Id. at 660 (citing Town East Ford Sales, Inc. v. Gray, 730 S.W.2d 796, 803.04 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1987, no writ) (mental anguish requires more than mere disappointment)).
231. Id. at 661.
232. Id. at 660-61.
233. Id. at 662.
234. Id. at 661-62.
235. Id. at 662.
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ling effect on business development in the community, with a consequent
loss of jobs and tax base.236 Unimpressed by the argument, the court held
that it is entirely proper for the judgment to have a chilling effect on viola-
tions of the law even if the result is that some would-be violators would not
remain in, or relocate to, Texas. 237
In Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Garrity238 Southwestern Bell deter-
mined that Ruth Garrity, after years of employment, was deficient in her job
performance and placed her on probation. On December 13, while on pro-
bation, Garrity reported that her chair slipped, causing pain in her back.
The next day Garrity reported to work and Janie Kellner, her supervisor,
took her to see a doctor. While at the doctor's office, Kellner and Garrity
had a dispute over completion of the medical release forms which Garrity
altered to restrict release of information to that visit. They returned to
work, where Garrity gathered some of her personal belongings and left, not
to return. Another supervisor, Helen Frazee, and the personnel manager,
Ruben Garcia, visited Garrity at her home on December 21. Their purpose
was to express concern for Garrity, to take her a form to use for her next
doctor's appointment, to explain why her injury had been classified as a sick-
ness instead of an accident, and to assure her that this reclassification was
unrelated to her probation.
On January 4, the company informed Garrity that her benefits were sus-
pended because of inadequate medical evidence to support her claim. On
January 9, Frazee and Kellner visited Garrity at her home to explain a pay-
roll error and to see how Garrity was doing. They also informed her that
the benefit office had inadequate information to continue benefits, and en-
couraged her to get her doctor to supply the necessary medical evidence.
The company continued to be dissatisfied with the medical information pro-
vided by Garrity and sought additional support for her disability. In an
effort to substantiate the disability, the company scheduled an appointment
for Garrity with another doctor on February 6. Garrity appeared for her
appointment, but refused to be examined. Due to the lack of medical evi-
dence to support her disability, and her refusal of the examination, Garrity
was told that she was expected to return to work the next day. Garrity did
not return to work. However, when the company learned that Garrity was
scheduled to undergo a myelogram on February 11, the company waited for
the results before taking disciplinary action.
On February 19, the company sent Garrity a letter stating that it needed
the results of the myelogram by February 22 or her benefits would be termi-
nated for lack of medical evidence. The company did not receive the results.
On February 26, Frazee and Kellner hand-delivered a letter informing Gar-
rity that her benefits were discontinued and that she was expected to return
to work on February 27. The letter continued that her failure to return to
work by February 28 would be considered "job abandonment and she would
236. Id.
237. Id. at 662-63.
238. No. 04-89-00549-CV (Tex. App.-San Antonio Oct. 10, 1990, no writ) (unpublished).
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be separated from employment." Garrity failed to report to work and was
discharged on March 1 for job abandonment. In a bench trial, the court
found that the company wrongfully discharged Garrity in violation of article
8307c, but in its findings of fact on this issue it held that the company termi-
nated Garrity for job abandonment.239 Nevertheless, the trial court con-
cluded that the company discharged Garrity in violation of article 8307c.2M
On appeal, the court first observed that the trial court's finding of fact was
in conflict with its conclusion of law.241 Where such a conflict exists, the
finding of fact controls. 242 The court analyzed the evidence in light of the
four factors set forth in Paragon Hotel Corp. v. Ramirez243 to determine
whether circumstantial evidence sufficiently supported a finding of wrongful
discharge under article 8307c.2A4 First, no evidence existed that any of the
company employees who participated in the decision to discharge Garrity
knew of her workers' compensation claim.245 Second, while some of the
company's employees showed some evidence of a negative attitude toward
Garrity's injury, none of these employees had any input in the decision to
discharge Garrity. 246 Third, there was no evidence that the company failed
to follow its policies. 247 Finally, no evidence showed that Garrity was
treated differently from other employees. 248 The court of appeals found that
the finding of fact did not support a causal connection between the filing of
Garrity's workers' compensation claim and her discharge.249 The court also
held that, as a matter of law, discharge for job abandonment does not consti-
tute wrongful discharge under article 8307c. 2 50 Therefore, the court re-
versed and rendered judgment for the company.251
In Mid-South Bottling Co. v. Cigainero252 Feff Cigainero injured his back
while delivering soft drinks to a store. He reported his injury to the com-
pany and was instructed to go to the hospital for treatment. Cigainero fol-
lowed instructions, and pursuant to his doctor's orders, remained off work
for approximately seven weeks. When he returned to work, Cigainero was
239. Id. slip op. at 18-19.
240. Id. slip op. at 11.
241. Id. slip op. at 19.
242. Id. (citing Gary Safe Co. v. A. C. Andrews Co., 568 S.W.2d 166, 168 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Howth v. French Indep. School Dist., 115 S.W.2d 1036,
1039 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1938), aff'd, 134 Tex. 211, 134 S.W.2d 1036 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1940, opinion adopted)).
243. 783 S.W.2d 654 ('ex. App.-E Paso 1990, writ denied).
244. Garrity, slip op. at 21. The four factors are: 1) knowledge of the compensation claim
by those making the decision on termination; 2) expression of a negative attitude toward the
plaintiff's injured condition; 3) failure to adhere to established company policies with regard to
progressive disciplinary action; and 4) discriminatory treatment of the plaintiff in comparison
to other employees allegedly guilty of similar infractions. Id. (citing Paragon Hotel Corp. v.
Ramirez, 783 S.W.2d at 658).
245. Id.
246. Id. slip op. at 21-22.
247. Id. slip op. at 22.
248. Id.
249. Id. slip op. at 19.
250. Id. slip op. at 22.
251. Id.
252. 799 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1990, writ denied).
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informed that he had been discharged. Cigainero sued the company for
wrongful discharge under article 8307c. The jury found for Cigainero. On
appeal, the company contended that the jury's verdict was supported by le-
gally and factually insufficient evidence. Specifically, the company argued
that it had discharged Cigainero because of his poor performance and his
inability to follow orders. The company's complaints about his performance
were supported by unsatisfactory monthly evaluations and a written warning
issued prior to his injury. The only evidence that supported the jury's ver-
dict was that Cigainero was discharged after filing the claim for workers'
compensation benefits.253 Nevertheless, the court held that there was suffi-
cient evidence to support the conclusion that Cigainero's claim against the
company contributed to his discharge, and affirmed the judgment in favor of
Cigainero. 25 4
In Carraway v. General Foods Corp.255 Edward Carraway, a union em-
ployee, worked as a clerk/lift truck operator in the shipping and warehouse
area. Carraway slipped and injured his back causing him to be out of his job
from February 21, 1985, until June 6, 1985. He then returned to work in the
same capacity on July 8. He continued to experience discomfort and was
therefore assigned a clerical position. On September 23, Carraway took a
second leave of absence because of his back pain. Carraway's physician indi-
cated that he could return to work on December 8. The company's workers'
compensation insurance carrier, however, learned that Carraway was work-
ing at a Safeway store while receiving workers' compensation and disability
benefits. The company discharged Carraway on November 26 for violating
two company rules: falsification of information and stealing. Although the
union refused to refer Carraway's grievance to arbitration, Carraway sued
the company for, inter alia, violation of article 8307c. The company moved
for summary judgment.
The federal district court noted that Carraway must only show that the
filing of a workers' compensation claim was a determining factor in the dis-
charge and that it need not be the sole reason for the discharge.256 If Car-
raway established a causal link between the discharge and the claim for
workers' compensation benefits, the company must rebut the alleged dis-
253. Id. at 390. The jury was probably influenced by the inconsistent testimony of Ben
McBay, the company employee who told Cigainero that he was discharged. McBay testified
on deposition that he learned of Cigainero's injury on June 30, the day that it occurred. Id. at
387. McBay stated at trial, however, that he did not learn of the injury until July 7 when he
returned to work and that by this time Cigainero had been discharged for failing to report to
work. Id. Cigainero's attorney successfully impeached his testimony with his prior deposition
testimony, and the impeachment of McBay's testimony apparently caused the jury to believe
that Cigainero was discharged for filing a claim. See id. at 388.
254. Id. slip op. at 3 (citing General Elec. Co. v. Kunze, 747 S.W.2d 826, 830 (Tex. App.-
Waco 1987, writ denied); Santex, Inc. v. Cunningham, 618 S.W.2d 557, 560 (Tex. App.-
Waco 1981, no writ); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c, § I (Vernon Supp. 1991)).
255. No. H-87-2188 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 9, 1990).
256. Id. slip op. at 10 (citing Azar Nut Co. v. Caille, 720 S.W.2d 685, 687 (Tex. App.-El
Paso 1986), aff'd, 734 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1987); Hughes Tool Co. v. Richards, 624 S.W.2d 598,
599 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cerl. denied, 456 U.S. 991 (1982)).
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crimination by showing a legitimate reason for the discharge.25 7 Carraway
argued that two pieces of evidence created a fact issue precluding summary
judgment. First, the termination letter provided that "accepting our disabil-
ity benefits, while in fact working elsewhere, constitutes a violation of [com-
pany rules]. '258 The letter also referred to Carraway's "occupational
illness" and the fact that he was receiving workers' compensation benefits.
Second, Carraway pointed to the testimony of another employee who stated
that the filing of a workers' compensation claim and working another job did
not violate company policy and that higher claims mean higher disability
pay and greater cost to the company. The court held that Carraway's evi-
dence did not create a fact issue of a causal link between Carraway's filing of
claims for workers' compensation benefits and his discharge.25 9 The court
noted that it was undisputed that the company returned Carraway to his
position after his first leave of absence and after receiving workers' compen-
sation benefits. 26° Accordingly, the court granted the company's motion for
summary judgment. 26'
In Pope v. MCI Telecommunications Corp.2 6 2 Brenda Pope sustained an
injury on the job on January 30, 1989. Although she was initially released to
return to work on February 13, 1989, her release was for half days only.
Additionally, Pope's physician advised against her returning to work at all.
For that reason, MCI's personnel manager instructed her to return home
until she was fully released to return to work. On March 29, 1989, Pope was
fully released and returned to MCI to resume work. In the meantime,
Pope's position had been eliminated as a result of restructuring and she was
discharged. Pope was given $15,000 in severance pay and was informed that
MCI provided a two weeks assistance program to help displaced workers
find new positions. However, Pope was informed of the two weeks assist-
ance program after the expiration of the two weeks. Pope sued MCI for
wrongful discharge under article 8307c claiming that she had been termi-
nated for filing her workers' compensation claim. The evidence showed that
MCI's administrative leave of absence policy provided for reinstatement to
an employee on a leave of absence for forty-two days or less, and that em-
ployees on leave in excess of forty-two days are reinstated only if the same or
comparable position is available. Additionally, under company policy, an
employee is provided up to two weeks of assistance in identifying a position
upon seeking reinstatement. After this two week period, an employee may
be terminated. MCI moved for summary judgment and argued that Pope's
workers' compensation claim was unrelated to her discharge.
The federal district court held that the fact of Pope's discharge following
her filing of a workers' compensation claim taken alone is not sufficient evi-
dence to raise a genuine issue of a causal link between the termination and
257. Id. slip op. at 10 (citing Hughes Tool Co. v. Richards, 624 S.W.2d at 599).
258. Id. slip op. at 10.
259. Id. slip op. at 10-11.
260. Id. slip op. at 1I.
261. Id.
262. No. H-87-2456 (S.D. Tex. June 8, 1990).
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the filing of the workers' compensation claim.263 Additionally, the court
held that MCI's undisputed summary judgment evidence established that
the company discharged Pope because her department was reorganized and
her position eliminated.264 Because the court found no causal connection
between the filing of the claim and the discharge, the court granted MCI's
motion for summary judgment.265
In Houston Northwest Medical Center Survivor, Inc. v. King266 Betty King
sued her former employer, Houston Northwest Medical Center, for wrong-
ful discharge under article 8307c. 267 While the jury awarded King $20,000
in exemplary damages, the jury failed to award actual damages. The Medi-
cal Center appealed and argued that the jury's failure to award actual dam-
ages to King precluded her from recovering any exemplary damages. King
argued that Wright v. Gifford-Hill & Co.268 eliminated the requirement
under the Workers' Compensation Act that a plaintiff prove and recover
actual damages before recovering exemplary damages.269 The court held
that King's reliance on Wright was misplaced. 270 In Wright the plaintiff had
sued her employer for gross negligence for the death of her husband under
article 8306 section 5.271 Under article 8306 section 5, an employer is ex-
empt from liability for actual damages and is liable only for exemplary dam-
ages if the plaintiff proves gross negligence. 272 In a suit for wrongful
discharge under article 8307c, however, a plaintiff may recover "reasonable
damages, ' 273 a phrase that has been interpreted to mean both actual and
exemplary damages.274 Because King was entitled to actual and exemplary
damages under article 8307C, 275 the jury's failure to find actual damages pre-
cluded an award of exemplary damages. 276 The court therefore reversed and
rendered judgment for the Medical Center.277
In Farah Manufacturing Co. v. Alvarado278 Jose Alvarado consulted with
an attorney after his release from the hospital and subsequently filed a work-
ers' compensation claim. Alvarado reported back to work and presented
Farah with two notes from his attending physicians that contained restric-
tions on certain physical activities. Alvarado admitted that these limitations
263. Id. slip op. at 10.
264. Id. slip op. at 10-11.
265. Id.
266. 788 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no writ).
267. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon Supp. 1991).
268. 725 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. 1987).
269. King, 788 S.W.2d at 181.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. (citing Castleberry v. Goolsby Bldg. Corp., 617 S.W.2d 665, 666 (rex. 1981)).
273. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
274. King, 788 S.W.2d at 181 (citing Azar Nut Co. v. Caille, 734 S.W.2d 667, 668 (Tex.
1987)).
275. In Azar Nut, 734 S.W.2d 667, the supreme court held that a plaintiff was entitled to
exemplary damages under article 8307c § 2.
276. King, 788 S.W.2d at 181-82.
277. Id. at 182.
278. 763 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1988), aff'd, 34 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 107 (Nov. 21,
1990).
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prohibited him from performing the job he had carried out prior to his ill-
ness. Farah advised Alvarado that it did not have any other work for him at
that time. Thereafter, Alvarado received a letter from Farah asking whether
he would accept the next available job or whether he would prefer to wait for
the job he had previously held. Alvarado responded that he would accept
any job Farah had available. One year passed without a job becoming avail-
able, and under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, Alvarado's
seniority and recall rights were terminated. Alvarado then filed suit against
Farah under article 8307c for wrongful discharge asserting that Farah had
recalled employees with less seniority to other job classifications after he was
laid off. Farah responded that the seniority provisions of the collective bar-
gaining agreement, coupled with Alvarado's medical restrictions, precluded
it from providing alternative employment. The jury awarded Alvarado
$138,080 in actual damages and $1,000,000 in punitive damages.
During the trial, Farah presented evidence to show that it had complied
with the collective bargaining agreement and that it had acted within the
legal mandates of the agreement. Alvarado, in rebuttal, called a previously
undisclosed witness to testify that she was a non-union employee who was
allegedly terminated from employment on a job she still could medically
perform within one week of having filed a workers' compensation claim. Al-
varado presented no other evidence of a similar occurrence. Prior to the
undisclosed witness' testimony, Alvarado had not offered direct proof that
the filing of his workers' compensation claim was a determinative factor in
Farah's decision not to recall him. The court of appeals reversed and re-
manded the case for a new trial on the ground that Alvarado failed to prop-
erly supplement his answer to an interrogatory. 279 Alvarado then appealed
to the supreme court, and the supreme court affirmed.280 Relying on numer-
ous cases addressing the same issue,281 the supreme court held that Alvarado
failed to show good cause for failing to designate the witness in response to
interrogatories and that admission into evidence of the testimony of the un-
disclosed witness was harmful error, thereby requiring reversal. 282
3. Claims Under the Unemployment Compensation Act
In American Petro Fina Co. v. Texas Employment Commission283 the
court upheld the Texas Employment Commission's (TEC) award of unem-
ployment compensation to two employees who elected to take early retire-
279. Id. at 535.
280. 34 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 107, 108 (Nov. 21, 1990).
281. Id. at 108 (citing Sharp v. Broadway Nat'l Bank, 784 S.W.2d 669 (Tex. 1990));
Rainbo Baking Co. v. Stafford, 787 S.W.2d 41 (Tex. 1990); McKinney v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins.
Co., 772 S.W.2d 72 (Tex. 1989); Clark v. Trailways, Inc., 774 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. 1989); Boothe
v. Hausler, 766 S.W.2d 788 (Tex. 1989); Gee v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 765 S.W.2d 394
(Tex. 1989); E. F. Hutton & Co. v. Youngblood, 741 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. 1987); Gutierrez v.
Dallas Indep. School Dist., 729 S.W.2d 691 (Tex. 1987); Morrow v. H.E.B., Inc., 714 S.W.2d
297 (Tex. 1986); Yeldell v. Holiday Hills Retirement and Nursing Center, Inc., 701 S.W.2d
243 (Tex. 1985)).
282. 34 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 109-10.
283. 795 S.W.2d 899 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1990, no writ).
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ment, rather than to have their lump sum retirement benefits decreased by
over twenty percent.28 4 The employees were members of a union and
worked for American Petro Fina Company (Fina) under a collective bar-
gaining agreement between the union and Fina. Fina had employed both
men since the late 1940's, and both had participated in a non-contributory
defined benefit retirement plan. When the union went on strike in January
of 1982, Fina changed the method of calculating the lump sum retirement
benefit for all employees retiring after April 1, 1982. The effect of the
change in the method of calculation resulted in a benefit reduction of ap-
proximately twenty-three percent for both employees. As a consequence,
both employees elected to take early retirement, effective March 1, 1982, and
then filed for unemployment compensation, claiming they were forced to
retire. The TEC awarded unemployment benefits to both employees, and
Fina fied suit to set aside the decision. The court upheld the TEC's finding
that, as a matter of policy, the claimants had good cause connected with
work for their resignations and that TEC precedents established that work-
ers who have accrued benefits reduced without their consent, or who have
the terms of their employment changed unilaterally by the employer, have
good cause connected with the work for resigning.285 The court further
noted that retirement, in and of itself, was not a disqualification from eligi-
bility for unemployment benefits. 286
In Texas Employment Commission v. Torvik 287 the Sheraton Plaza Royale
hotel appealed from a judgment against it for unemployment compensation
benefits. Douglas Torvik was engaged in a disturbance with another em-
ployee and a customer which he acknowledged constituted a sufficient basis
for his discharge. Torvik, however, denied that his conduct was intentional
because it resulted from his mental illness (schizophrenia and manic depres-
sion). While his doctor had prescribed medication to control the mood sw-
ings caused by his mental illness, Torvik had not taken the medication for
several years because of the unpleasant side effects. The TEC denied
Torvik's claim for benefits because it found that he had been discharged for
"misconduct" 288 and Torvik appealed the decision to the trial court. The
trial court reversed the TEC's decision. On appeal, Torvik contended that
his conduct was not intentional and therefore not misconduct, but was
284. Id. at 901.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 902 (citing Redd v. Texas Emplorment Comm'n, 431 S.W.2d 16 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that employee who reached mandatory
retirement age agreed to by union did not leave work voluntarily)).
287. 797 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ).
288. Texas Revised Civil Statutes article 5221b-17(q) defines "misconduct" as follows:
"Misconduct" means [1] mismanagement of a position of employment by action
or inaction, [2] neglect that places in jeopardy the lives or property of others, [3]
intentional wrongdoing or malfeasance, [4] intentional violation of a law, [5]
violation of a policy or rule adopted to ensure orderly work and the safety of
employees, but does not include an act of misconduct that is in response to an
unconscionable act of an employer or superior.
TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art 5221b-17(q) (Vernon 1987).
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caused by his mental illness.2 89 The TEC argued that Torvik's decision to
not take his medication was intentional.29 The court of appeals observed
that only two of the five definitions of misconduct require an intentional
state of mind.291 Because Torvik's conduct could fall within one of the three
remaining categories, the court held that there was substantial evidence to
support the TEC's decision; therefore, the trial court's decision was reversed
and the TEC's denial of benefits was atfirmed. 292
II. ERISA PREEMPTION OF TEXAS COMMON LAW CLAIMS
The primary purpose of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA),293 originally enacted in 1974, is to protect the interests of partici-
pants and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans.2 94 Accordingly, ER-
ISA requires disclosure and reporting, establishes certain fiduciary standards
of conduct, responsibility, and obligation, and authorizes appropriate penal-
ties against employers, trustees, and other entities who fail to comply with its
mandates. 295 With respect to employment status, ERISA strictly prohibits
discharging an employee under certain circumstances. 296
The United States Supreme Court defined the breadth and impact of the
ERISA preemption doctrine in two unanimous decisions: Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co. v. Taylor297 and Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux.2 98 In
those decisions, the Supreme Court expressly held that the preemption
clause of ERISA provides that ERISA supersedes all state laws insofar as
they relate to any employee benefit plan, except state laws that regulate in-
surance.2 99 Recognizing that the preemption provisions of ERISA are delib-
erately expansive, the Supreme Court observed that Congress provided
explicit direction that ERISA preempts common law causes of action filed in
state court. 3°
°
289. 797 S.W.2d at 197.
290. Id.
291. Id. (citing "intentional wrongdoing or malfeasance" or "intentional violation of a
law").
292. Id.
293. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
294. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983).
295. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b).
296. Id. § 1140. Under ERISA, an employer cannot discharge an employee "for exercising
any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit plan... or for the
purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which such [employee] may become
entitled under the plan... ." Id.
297. 481 U.S. 58 (1987).
298. 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
299. Metropolitan, 481 U.S. at 62; Pilot, 481 U.S. at 44-45. There are limited exceptions to
this general rule. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1003(b), 1144 (1988). For a thorough discussion of ER-
ISA's preemptive effect on state laws, see Pfeiffer & Hall, supra note 91, at 128-32.
300. 481 U.S. at 44-45; see Cefalu v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 871 F.2d 1290, 1295 (5th Cir.
1989) (holding that ERISA preempted plaintiff's state law contract claim); Gorman v. Life
Ins. Co. of America, 34 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 304, 307, 309 (Jan. 30, 1991) (holding that ERISA
preempted plaintiff's claims for breach of fiduciary duty, punitive damages, prejudgment inter-
est and mental anguish damages); Cathey v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 34 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.
309, 309 (Jan. 30, 1991) (holding that ERISA preempted plaintiff's claims under Tex. Ins.
Code art. 21.21, § 16, Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act § 17.50(a)(4), and Tex. Ins. Code
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Despite the United States Supreme Court's broad interpretation of ER-
ISA's preemption provisions and the specific wrongful discharge prohibition
within ERISA,301 the Texas Supreme Court, in McClendon v. Ingersoll-
Rand Co. 30 2, created an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine that
ran afoul of ERISA.30 3 In McClendon the supreme court held that a plain-
tiff states a cause of action if he alleges "that the principal reason for his
termination was the employer's desire to avoid contributing to or paying
benefits under the employee's pension fund."' 304 The United States Supreme
Court granted Ingersoll-Rand's petition for a writ of certiorari to determine
whether ERISA preempts a state common law claim that an employer has
unlawfully discharged an employee to interfere with the employee's attain-
ment of benefits under an ERISA-covered benefit plan.30 5
Within eight months of granting Ingersoll-Rand's petition for a writ of
certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
Texas Supreme Court and held that ERISA preempts an employee's com-
mon law claim that he was discharged to prevent attainment of benefits
under an ERISA plan.30 6 A unanimous Supreme Court held that ERISA
impliedly preempted the Texas cause of action because ERISA proscribes
the same conduct that was the subject of McClendon's claim.307 ERISA
provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine suspend, expel,
discipline, or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for exer-
cising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of an em-
ployee benefit plan . . . or for the purpose of interfering with the
attainment of any right to which such participant may become entitled
under the plan .... 308
art. 3.62); Pan American Life Ins. Co. v. Erbauer Constr. Co., 34 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 315, 315
(Jan. 30, 1991) (holding that ERISA preempted plaintiff's claims for bad faith settlement prac-
tices and violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act and the Texas Insurance
Code); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Garrity, No. 04-89-00549-CV (rex. App.-San Antonio
Oct. 10, 1990, no writ) (unpublished) (holding that ERISA preempted plaintiff's claims for
invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress); Cadillac Ins. Co. v. L.P.C.
Distrib. Co., 770 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, no writ) (holding that ERISA
preempted plaintiffs' claims for violations of Deceptive Trade Practices Act, TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46 (Vernon 1987), TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 21.21 (Vernon
1981 & Supp. 1991) [hereinafter DTPAJ, and duty of good faith and fair dealing); E-Systems,
Inc. v. Taylor, 744 S.W.2d 956 (rex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied) (holding that ERISA
preempted plaintiffs' claim that employer orally promised they would receive retirement bene-
fits at greater rate than originally calculated); Sams v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 735 S.W.2d 486, 489
(Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1987, no writ) (holding that ERISA preempted plaintiff's
claims for breach of contract and conversion); Giles v. TI Employees Pension Plan, 715
S.W.2d 58, 59 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that ERISA preempted
plaintiff's claims for violations of DTPA and for misrepresentation).
301. Pilot, 481 U.S. at 41.
302. 779 S.W.2d 69 (rex. 1989), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 478, 112 L. Ed. 2d 474 (1990).
303. Id. at 71.
304. Id. (emphasis added).
305. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 58 U.S.L.W. 3650 (U.S. Apr. 16, 1990) (No. 89-
1298).
306. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 111 S. Ct. 478, 483, 112 L. Ed. 2d 474, 484 (1990).
307. Id. at 486, 112 L. Ed. 2d at 487.
308. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1988).
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Recalling its holding in Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, 3°9 the Court
again recognized that Congress intended ERISA's civil enforcement provi-
sions "to be the exclusive remedy for rights guaranteed under ERISA
.... "310 "Unquestionably, the Texas cause of action purports to provide a
remedy for the violation of a right expressly guaranteed by [section 1140]
and exclusively enforced by [section 1132(a)]."1311
The Court also rejected the Texas Supreme Court's attempt to distinguish
its holding from contrary holdings of other courts.3 12 The Texas Supreme
Court found that the claim was not preempted because McClendon was not
seeking lost pension benefits. 313 The Supreme Court held:
Not only is [section 1132(a)] the exclusive remedy for vindicating [sec-
tion 1140]-protected rights, there is no basis in [section 1132(a)'s] lan-
guage for limiting ERISA actions to only those which seek 'pension
benefits.' It is clear that the relief requested here is well within the
power of federal courts to provide. Consequently, it is no answer to a
pre-emption argument that a particular plaintiff is not seeking recovery
of pension benefits. 314
The Supreme Court315 also held that the Texas cause of action was explic-
itly preempted because the cause of action "relate[s] to" an ERISA benefit
plan.3 16 Because the .existence of Ingersoll-Rand's pension plan is a critical
factor in establishing liability under the cause of action, the cause of action
clearly "relates to" the essence of the pension plan.317 McClendon argued
that the cause of action did not relate to a plan because the only issue in the
claim is the employer's improper motive.318 The Court held that the argu-
ment missed the mark because, without the pension plan, no cause of action
exists. 3
19
McClendon also argued that the definition of "state" under ERISA320
foreclosed preemption because the Texas cause of action focuses on the em-
ployer's termination decision rather than the terms, conditions, and adminis-
tration of the plan. 3 2 1 The Court rejected McClendon's argument and held
309. 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
310. McClendon, 111 S. Ct. at 485, 112 L. Ed. 2d at 487.
311. Id. at 486, 112 L. Ed. 2d at 488.
312. McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 779 S.W.2d at 70-71.
313. Id. at 71 n.3.
314. McClendon, Ill S. Ct. at 486, 112 L. Ed. 2d at 488.
315. This portion of the Court's decision was decided 6-3. Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices White, Scalia, Kennedy and Souter joined Justice O'Connor.
316. Id. at 483, 112 L.Ed.2d at 484.
317. Id. A unanimous Supreme Court vindicated the well-reasoned dissent authored by
Justice Cook. See McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 779 S.W.2d 69, 71-72 (Tex. 1989) (Cook,
J., joined by Phillips, C.J., and Hecht, J.). Justice Cook also concluded that the majority's
newly-created common law cause of action was preempted because it "relates to" a benefit
plan regulated by ERISA. Id. at 72; see also Pfeiffer and Hall, supra note 91, at 131-32.
318. McClendon, 111 S. Ct. at 484, 112 L. Ed. 2d at 485.
319. Id.
320. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(2) provides that "[t]he term 'State' includes a State, any political
subdivisions thereof, or any agency or instrumentality of either, which purports to regulate,
directly or indirectly, the terms and conditions of employee benefit plans covered by this
subchapter."
321. McClendon, 111 S. Ct. at 484, 112 L. Ed. 2d at 485; see 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(2).
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that the provision was expansive, rather than restrictive, and that Texas'
cause of action was within ERISA's definition of "state. '322 The Court
stated that its conclusion was supported by Congress' intent to ensure that
plans, and plan sponsors, would be subject to a uniform body of benefit law
and to eliminate inconsistent directives among states or between states and
the federal government.323 The Court observed that:
It is foreseeable that state courts, exercising their common law powers,
might develop different substantive standards applicable to the same
employer conduct, requiring the tailoring of plans and employer con-
duct to the peculiarities of the law of each jurisdiction. Such an out-
come is fundamentally at odds with the goal of uniformity that
Congress sought to implement.324
Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Texas Supreme
Court and struck down the common law cause of action created by the court
in McClendon.325
Il. COMPELLING ARBITRATION OF EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES UNDER
THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION AcT
Arbitration has traditionally been used for the settlement of labor disputes
involving union employees. Nevertheless, as a result of the substantial judi-
cial and statutory erosion of the employment-at-will doctrine during the
1980's, some employers are now turning to arbitration, rather than the
courts, as a means of resolving disputes even with nonunion employees.
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) provides the framework for arbitra-
tion of employment-related disputes in the nonunion context. 326 The FAA
provides in section 2 that contractual arbitration agreements in maritime
transactions or transactions involving commerce shall be "valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or inequity for the
revocation of any contract. '327 The courts have construed "commerce"
broadly within the meaning of the FAA. 328
The FAA provides two parallel devices for enforcing an arbitration clause
in a nonunion employment agreement. Section 3 empowers the courts to
stay judicial proceedings when a valid arbitration agreement exists. 329 Sec-
tion 4 authorizes a party, aggrieved by the failure of another party to arbi-
trate, to obtain an order from the court directing that such arbitration
322. McClendon, I1l S. Ct. at 484, 112 L. Ed. 2d at 485.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 484, 112 L. Ed. 2d at 486.
325. Id. at 486, 112 L. Ed. 2d at 488.
326. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1988). Fifty states and the District of Columbia have adopted arbi-
tration statutes similar to the FAA. The Texas General Arbitration Act specifically excludes
from coverage collective bargaining agreements between an employer and a labor union. TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 224-238-6 (Vernon 1973 & Supp. 1991). Arbitration between
employers and employees is governed generally by TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 239-249
(Vernon 1973 & Supp. 1991).
327. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
328. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 407 (1967); Creson v.
Quickprint of Amer., Inc., 558 F. Supp. 984, 986 (W.D. Mo. 1983).
329. 9 U.S.C. § 3.
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proceed.330
The only limitation to the FAA's coverage is found in section I which
specifically excludes from coverage "contracts of employment of seamen,
railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or inter-
state commerce." 331 Although on its face this provision appears to greatly
limit the use of arbitration in the employment context, courts have construed
the exclusion to apply only to workers directly employed in the transporta-
tion industries. 332
A. Preemptive and Exclusive Effect of the FAA
The value of the FAA in the employment context lies in its preemptive
and exclusive effect. An arbitration clause carefully drafted under the FAA,
providing for final and binding arbitration, establishes arbitration as the ex-
clusive forum for employment-related disputes, even in the face of contrary
state law. For example, in Perry v. Thomas333 the United States Supreme
Court struck down a California law to the extent it provided for civil litiga-
tion of wage payment claims.334 The employee contended that section 229
of the California Labor Code authorized him to maintain a judicial action to
recover his commission, although he had previously executed an agreement
to arbitrate any controversy arising out of his employment or termination of
employment. The Supreme Court held that the FAA preempts contrary
state law and is enforceable in both state and federal courts.335 Thus, federal
and state courts will enforce an arbitration agreement between an employer
and employee who have agreed to arbitrate a particular dispute, notwith-
standing contrary state law which requires judicial resolution.336
Moreover, not only is the FAA being used to resolve disputes concerning
the rights and obligations of the employer and employee under the employ-
ment agreement, i.e., contract claims, but the courts have increasingly held
that tort claims associated with the employment relationship are covered by
arbitration clauses in employment contracts. Tort claims such as defama-
tion, negligence, fraud, invasion of privacy and breach of fiduciary duty have
been held arbitrable under the FAA. 337
330. 9 U.S.C. § 4.
331. 9 U.S.C. § 1.
332. Miller Brewing Co. v. Brewery Workers Local Union No. 9, AFL-CIO, 739 F.2d
1159, 1162 (7th Cir. 1984); Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064, 1069
(2d Cir. 1972).
333. 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
334. Id. at 491.
335. Id.
336. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985); Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460
U.S. 1 (1983).
337. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (fraud, breach of fiduciary duty);
Zolezzi v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 789 F.2d 1447 (9th Cir. 1986) (defamation, invasion of
privacy); Morgan v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 729 F.2d 1163 (8th Cir. 1984) (slan-
der); Block 175 Corp. v. Fairmont Hotel Management Co., 648 F. Supp. 450 (D. Colo. 1986)
(breach of fiduciary duty, intentional or reckless breach of duty); Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fen-
ner & Smith, Inc. v. Thomson, 574 F. Supp. 1472 (E.D. Mo. 1983) (breach of restrictive cove-
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Circuit courts stand divided on the arbitrability of intentional torts when
the tortious acts complained of occur after termination of employment. In
Coudert v. Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis33 8 the Second Circuit held that
an employee's claims for defamation, invasion of privacy, and emotional dis-
tress were not subject to arbitration because the tortious acts complained of
occurred after the employee's termination. 339 Other courts broadly interpret
the phrase "arising out of employment or termination of employment" to
include tortious acts which occur after termination of employment.34° In
view of the Supreme Court's admonition favoring arbitration, 34' it seems
reasonable to require arbitration of tort claims if the court is satisfied that
the parties contemplated that such an action was included within the scope
of the arbitration clause.
B. Arbitrability of Federal Statutory Claims
Although courts will order arbitration of state contract and tort claims
associated with the employment relationship, the courts' attitude toward ar-
bitration of employment discrimination claims arising under federal law is
another matter. In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. 342 the Supreme Court
considered under what circumstances, if any, a prior submission of the claim
to final arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement forecloses an em-
ployee's statutory right to a trial de novo under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.343 The Supreme Court held that arbitration, pursuant to a
collective bargaining agreement under section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act (LMRA), is an inappropriate forum for the final resolution of
the rights created under Title VII.34
The Gardner-Denver rationale has been extended to cover nonunion em-
ployees under the FAA and to cover other federal statutory claims. In a
recent Fifth Circuit opinion, Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,345 the
court held that a stockbroker who was fired by a brokerage firm could pur-
sue a Title VII lawsuit for sex discrimination rather than submit the claim to
commercial arbitration under the FAA as the employer demanded.346 Ap-
nants); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. McCollum, 666 S.W.2d 604 (Tex.
App.-Houston (14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (tortious interference with contracts), cerL
denied, 469 U.S. 1127 (1985); see P. Gillette & J. Flanagan, Paper delivered to the American
Bar Association Annual Meeting of the Labor and Employment Law Section (Aug. 8, 1989).
338. 705 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1983).
339. Id.
340. Aspero v. Shearson Am. Express, Inc., 768 F.2d 106 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 1026 (1985); Morgan v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 729 F.2d 1163 (8th Cir.
1984).
341. See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
342. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
343. The Supreme Court had previously adopted a federal policy favoring arbitration of
labor disputes under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187
(1988). United Steelworkers of Amer. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers of Amer. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steel-
workers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
344. 415 U.S. at 60.
345. 905 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1990).
346. Id.
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plying the Gardner-Denver rationale to wage disputes under the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA),347 the Supreme Court in Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best
Freight System, Inc. 348 held that an employee may pursue an action in fed-
eral district court, alleging a violation of the minimum wage provisions of
the FLSA, despite the fact that he had unsuccessfully submitted the wage
claim to a grievance committee pursuant to the union's collective bargaining
agreement. 349 Arguably, the courts would reach the same result in the non-
union employment context and allow an employee to pursue an FLSA claim
in court notwithstanding a valid arbitration agreement.
Evidently, courts will not enforce arbitration agreements that waive an
employee's right to bring a judicial action against his employer under the
FLSA and Title VII. The Supreme Court's treatment of FLSA and Title
VII claims under the FAA should not be interpreted so broadly as to fore-
close arbitration of all federal statutory claims. Many federal statutory
claims unrelated to employment discrimination are arbitrable.350
Circuit courts are divided over the arbitrability of claims under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA).351 The Fourth Cir-
cuit recently ruled in Gilmer v. Interstate Johnson Lane Corp.352 that an
employment arbitration agreement is enforceable to resolve a claim asserted
under the ADEA. The Gilmer ruling ordering the arbitration of ADEA
claims conflicts directly with a decisi6n of the Third Circuit. The Third
Circuit in Nicholson v. CPC International Inc. 35 3 found that a former em-
ployee's ADEA claim not subject to arbitration despite his agreement to
arbitrate. The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in Gilmer to con-
sider whether claims brought under ADEA are subject to compulsory
arbitration. 354
C. Preclusive Effect of Arbitral Decisions
From the employer's viewpoint, a major incentive for including arbitra-
tion clauses in nonunion employment agreements is the potential preclusive
effect of the arbitral decision. An employer who obtains a favorable ruling in
arbitration really has not won if he must later litigate the dispute in court.
By requiring arbitration of employment-related disputes, the employer hopes
to prevent a later resort to the judicial forum: an employee should not get
two bites at the apple.
The FAA on its face implies that arbitration awards will be granted
preclusive effect except under limited circumstances. Section 10 of the FAA
347. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988).
348. 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
349. Id. at 746.
350. Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (arbi-
tration of securities claims); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220
(1987) (arbitration of RICO and Securities Exchange Act § 10(b) claims); Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (arbitration of antitrust claims).
351. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988).
352. 895 F.2d 195 (4th Cir. 1990).
353. 877 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1989).
354. Gilmer, Ill S. Ct. 41, 112 L. Ed. 2d 59 (1990).
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enumerates only four grounds for vacating an arbitration award: 1) if the
award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; 2) if there was
evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators; 3) if the arbitrators were
guilty of misconduct by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced;
or 4) if the arbitrators exceeded their powers or imperfectly executed their
powers.35 5
In actuality, whether an arbitral decision in the nonunion context fore-
closes a second adjudication in the courts depends on the nature of the claim
asserted by the employee. If the employee is asserting state common law or
statutory claims, apparently an arbitral decision will be final and binding on
both the employer and employee, if arbitration was the parties' intent, and
judicial review will be limited.356 Moreover, the Supreme Court has ruled
that state proceedings that otherwise require the use of judicial forums will
be preempted by an agreement to arbitrate that is enforceable under the
FAA.357
As noted, the preclusive effect of arbitral decisions resolving federal statu-
tory employment discrimination claims is much less certain. However, even
where federal discrimination claims are at issue, the employer should be al-
lowed to admit the arbitration award into evidence at the subsequent trial.
Although the Supreme Court in Gardner-Denver rejected the preclusive ef-
fect of an arbitral decision in Title VII litigation, it also held that a court
may admit an arbitral decision as evidence and accord it such weight as the
court determines appropriate. 358 The factors identified by the Court to aid
courts in determining the weight to be accorded an arbitral decision include
"... the existence of provisions in the collective-bargaining agreement that
conform substantially with Title VII, the degree ofproceduralfairness in the
arbitralforum, adequacy of the record with respect to the issue of discrimi-
nation, and the special competence of particular arbitrators. ' 359
D. State Court Enforcement of the FAA
As a matter of federal substantive law, the FAA is enforceable in state, as
well as the federal, courts to compel the arbitration of disputes within the
scope of the parties' written agreement to arbitrate. 36° Recently, in Merrill,
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, and Smith, Inc. v. Longoria,36 1 the Corpus Christi
355. 9 U.S.C. § 10.
356. But see Swenson v. Management Recruiters Int'l, Inc., 858 F.2d 1304 (8th Cir. 1988)
(holding state law discrimination claims which serve as counterpart to Title VII not subject to
arbitration under FAA).
357. See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
358. 415 U.S. at 60.
359. Id. n.21 (emphasis added).
360. See generally Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987) (FAA preempts California Labor
Code); Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985) (FAA requires courts to
compel arbitration); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (FAA preempts California
franchise law); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983)
(North Carolina contract dispute arbitrable under the FAA); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood &
Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967) (New Jersey contract dispute arbitrable under the
FAA).
361. 783 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, orig. proc.).
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court of appeals was confronted with an application for writ of mandamus to
compel the arbitration of a wrongful discharge claim lodged by an employee
against his employer brokerage firm. The arbitration agreement provided:
"I agree to arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy that may arise be-
tween me and my firm, or a customer, or any other person, that is required
to be arbitrated under the rules, constitutions, or by-laws of the organiza-
tions with which I register." 36 2 In compelling arbitration, the appellate
court emphasized that arbitration is required when the issue, in this case
wrongful termination, falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement, 36 3
that a strong federal policy favors arbitration,3 64 and that any doubts con-
cerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of
arbitration.365
The employee's wife also filed a claim against the brokerage firm alleging
loss of consortium as a result of Merrill Lynch's alleged actions toward her
husband. The arbitration of her claim was also at issue. However, since she
was not a party to the contract, the court concluded that the wife was not
obligated to proceed to arbitration on her individual claim.366 In recogni-
tion of the derivative nature of the wife's claim, arising solely from her hus-
band's employment contract, the court ordered that the trial court hold her
claim in abeyance until her husband's claims were arbitrated.
367
IV. COVENANTS NOT To COMPETE
On June 6, 1990, the Texas Supreme Court handed down decisions in
three important covenant not to compete cases: Martin v. Credit Protection
Association, In,368 Juliette Fowler Homes, Inc. v. Welch Associates, Inc.,369
and DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp.,3 70 but denied an application for writ of
error in a fourth case, Bland v. Henry & Peters, P.C.3 7 1 The court decided
the cases under the common law, even though the Covenants Not to Com-
pete Act 372 (CNCA), a newly enacted statute, specifically provided that it
applied to covenants entered into before, on, or after the effective date of the
legislation, August 28, 1989. 373 While the supreme court did not address
CNCA, the court noted that the result in Martin, Juliette Fowler Homes and
362. Id. at 230.
363. Id.
364. Id. (citing Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985)).
365. Id. (citing Moses H. Cone Memorial Hasp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1
(1983)).
366. Id. at 231.
367. Id.
368. 793 S.W.2d 667 (rex. 1990).
369. 793 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. 1990).
370. 793 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. 1990).
371. 763 S.W.2d 5 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1988, writ denied).
372. TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 15.50 (Vernon Supp. 1991) [hereinafter CNCA].
373. Id. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals recently applied CNCA to a noncompetition
agreement that was entered into before the effective date of the statute in Webb v. Hartman
Newspapers, Inc., 793 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ). Because
the cause of action arose after the effective date of the statute, the court rejected the promisor's
argument that the trial court improperly applied the statute retroactively. Id. at 304.
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DeSantis would have been the same under CNCA as under the common
law. 374 Although the court indicated that the result would be the same, the
court chose to "leave for another day" the issues of the applicability of
CNCA to all noncompetition agreements and whether the common law
principles set out in the three cases would control in the application of
CNCA.375 The similarity between the statutory and common law require-
ments suggests that the framework of the DeSantis, Martin, and Juliette
Fowler Homes decisions will extend to applications of CNCA.
A. Common Law Criteria
Generally, an agreement not to compete is a restraint of trade and is unen-
forceable because it violates public policy.376 The DeSantis opinion, which
contains the court's most thorough and comprehensive discussion of non-
competition agreements of the three cases, provides that under common law
a noncompetition agreement is unenforceable unless it meets the following
three criteria: 1) the agreement must be ancillary to an otherwise valid trans-
action or relationship; 377 2) the restraint created by the agreement must not
be greater than that necessary to protect the promisee's legitimate inter-
est;378 and 3) the promisee's need for the protection afforded by the agree-
ment must not be outweighed by either the hardship to the promisor or any
injury likely to the public. 37 9 A noncompetition agreement that fails to meet
all three requirements is unenforceable. 380
374. See Martin, 793 S.W.2d at 669 n.1; Juliette Fowler Homes, 793 S.W.2d at 663-64 n.6;
DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 684-85.
375. DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 685. The purpose of the Covenants Not to Compete Act was
to overrule Hill v. Mobile Auto Trim, Inc., 725 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 1987) and return to the
supreme court's common law principles developed over the twenty-seven years prior to the
supreme court's Hill decision. For a thorough discussion of the legislative intent in enacting
the Covenants Not to Compete Act, see Pfeiffer & Hall, supra note 91, at 133-36.
376. DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 681 (citing Frankiewicz v. National Comp Assocs., 633
S.W.2d 505, 507 (Tex. 1982); Weatherford Oil Tool Co. v. Campbell, 161 Tex. 310, 340
S.W.2d 950, 951 (1960); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 186 (1981)).
377. Id. (citing Justin Belt Co. v. Yost, 502 S.W.2d 681, 683-84 (Tex. 1973); Potomac Fire
Ins. Co. v. State, 18 S.W.2d 929, 934-35 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1929, writ ref'd); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 187 (1981)).
378. Id. at 682 (citing Henshaw v. Kroenecke, 656 S.W.2d 416, 418 (Tex. 1983); Weather-
ford Oil Tool Co. v. Campbell, 161 Tex. 310, 340 S.W.2d 950, 951 (1960); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188(l)(a) (1981)).
379. Id. at 682 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188(l)(b) (1981)).
380. Id. at 681. Under the Covenants Not to Compete Act, § 15.50 provides that a cove-
nant not to compete is enforceable to the extent that it:
(1) is ancillary to an otherwise enforceable agreement but, if the covenant not to
compete is executed on a date other than the date on which the underlying
agreement is executed, such covenant must be supported by independent valua-
ble consideration; and (2) contains reasonable limitations as to time, geographi-
cal area, and scope of activity to be restrained that do not impose a greater
restraint than is necessary to protect the goodwill or other business interest of
the promisee.
TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50(1) & (2). The "ancillary to" requirement in § 15.50(1)
is consistent with the supreme court's decision in Justin Belt Co. v. Yost, 502 S.W.2d 681 (Tex.
1973), holding that "contracts which are in reasonable restraint of trade must be ancillary to
and in support of another contract." Id. at 683. The rationale for the reasonableness test in
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L Adequate Consideration
Like any contract, a noncompetition agreement must be supported by ade-
quate consideration to be enforceable. This requirement is satisfied if the
covenant is ancillary to an otherwise enforceable agreement that is executed
at the same time as the underlying agreement. Therefore, a noncompetition
agreement that is executed contemporaneously with an employment con-
tract or contract for the sale of a business should meet this requirement. In
Martin the court noted that special training or knowledge acquired by the
employee during employment may constitute sufficient independent valuable
consideration to support a noncompetition agreement.381 If the employee is
an employee at-will, however, independent consideration is necessary.382 In
Martin the employee signed a noncompetition agreement after his employer
told him that his employment would be terminated if he refused to sign the
agreement. Noting that employment-at-will is not an enforceable agreement
since either party may terminate the relationship at any time, the court held
that the covenant not to compete was not ancillary to an enforceable em-
ployment agreement as a matter of law and was, therefore, not
enforceable. 383
§ 15.50(2) was first set forth in Weatherford Oil Tool Co. v. Campbell, 161 Tex. 310, 340
S.W.2d 950 (1960):
The test usually stated for determining the validity of the covenant as written
is whether it imposes upon the employee any greater restraint than is reasonably
necessary to protect the business and good will of the employer .... The period
of time during which the restraint is to last and the territory that is included are
important factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of the
agreement.
Id. at 312-13, 340 S.W.2d at 951.
Under the supreme court's earlier decision in Hill v. Mobile Auto Trim, Inc., 725 S.W.2d
168 (Tex. 1987), the court held that a covenant not to compete must meet four broad require-
ments to represent a reasonable covenant: 1) the covenant must be necessary for the protec-
tion of the employer, Le., the employer must have a legitimate interest in protecting business
goodwill or trade secrets; 2) the covenant must not be oppressive to the employee, Le., limita-
tions as to time, territory, and activity must be reasonable; 3) the covenant must not be injuri-
ous to the public by preventing competition or by depriving the community of needed goods;
and 4) the employer must give consideration for something of value, Le., the employer must
impart special training or knowledge to the employee. 725 S.W.2d at 170-71. The court also
determined that a covenant is unenforceable if it limits competition or restrains the right to
engage in a common calling. Id. at 172.
381. Martin, 793 S.W.2d at 670. The supreme court specifically disapproved of the holding
in Bland v. Henry & Peters P.C., 763 S.W.2d 5, 8 (rex. App.-Tyler 1988, writ denied), that
the only consideration that can support a covenant not to compete is special training or knowl-
edge. See DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 681 n.6. The court stated that a noncompetition agreement
must be supported by consideration, but the consideration is not limited to special training or
knowledge. Id.
382. Martin, 793 S.W.2d at 670. In Property Tax Assocs., Inc. v. Staffeldt, 800 S.W.2d 349
(Tex. App.-El Paso 1990, no writ), the plaintiff executed an employment contract which
provided for an annual salary of $30,000 and included a noncompetition clause. The court of
appeals held that because the noncompetition clause was executed as a part of the employment
contract, no independent consideration was necessary. Id. at 350. In Webb v. Hartman News-
papers, Inc., 793 S.W.2d 302 (rex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ), the covenant
not to compete was part of the employment contract executed by the plaintiff; therefore, no
independent consideration was required to enforce the covenant. Id. at 304.
383. Id. at 669-70. In Daytona Group of Tex., Inc. v. Smith, 800 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. App-
Corpus Christi 1990, no writ), the Corpus Christi court of appeals noted the similarities in the
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Caselaw provides little guidance on what satisfies the requirement for ade-
quate consideration. General contract law suggests that the consideration
must be something more than a nominal amount, L e., the consideration must
approximate the value of what the employee gives up under the noncompeti-
tion agreement. This could be structured as a monthly payment while em-
ployed or severance pay when terminated. The safest route is to make the
agreement ancillary to an enforceable employment contract under which the
employer sacrifices the at-will relationship for the noncompetition agree-
ment. However, other employment related compensation, for example, sev-
erance pay or eligibility for profit sharing or bonus plan participation, could
serve as the independent consideration with the at-will relationship retained.
2 The Restraint May be no Greater than Necessary to Protect a
Legitimate Interest
Because a covenant not to compete is a restraint of trade, the promisee
must establish that the covenant is necessary to protect a legitimate interest
such as business goodwill, trade secrets, 38 4 or other confidential and proprie-
tary information. 3 5 In DeSantis, the supreme court addressed the question
of what constitutes a legitimate, protectable interest.
In DeSantis, Wackenhut hired DeSantis to manage its Houston office. At
the beginning of his employment, DeSantis signed a noncompetition agree-
ment. DeSantis worked for Wackenhut for about three years until Wacken-
hut terminated his employment.
Within a month of his termination, DeSantis formed a competing business
and began contacting businesses about his services, including ten to fifteen
requirements under common law and under the Act for a covenant not to compete to be
enforceable. The court then focused its discussion on whether the agreement was supported by
consideration and whether it was necessary to protect a legitimate business interest. The court
noted that the agreement not to compete was ancillary to an at-will employment relationship.
Relying on Martin and the Act, the court found that the agreement was not enforceable under
either § 15.50 or common law because it was not ancillary to an otherwise enforceable agree-
ment. Id. at 289.
The supreme court's holding in Martin that an employment-at-will contract is not an other-
wise enforceable agreement for purposes of independent consideration to support a noncompe-
tition agreement, 793 S.W.2d at 669-70, is inconsistent with the court's previous holding in
Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co. that an at-will contract is a valid contract with which third per-
sons are not free to tortiously interfere, 767 S.W.2d 686, 689 (Tex. 1989). It seems that an at-
will contract must be enforceable for both purposes or not at all.
384. Trade secrets are legitimate interests that may be protected by a noncompetition
agreement. Martin, 793 S.W.2d at 670 n.3. Customer lists and pricing information are exam-
ples of trade secrets. Murrco Agency, Inc. v. Ryan, 800 S.W.2d 600, 604-05 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1990, no writ). Secrecy is key to establishing the existence of a trade secret. The infor-
mation may not be readily available or generally known. Gonzales v. Zamora, 791 S.W.2d
258, 264 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ) (suit involving not a noncompetition
agreement, but rather breach of confidential relationship and unfair competition). "However,
when money and time are invested in the development of a procedure or device which is based
on an idea which is not new to a particular industry, and when that certain procedure or device
is not generally known, trade secret protection will exist." Id. (emphasis added). In Gonzales
the court placed importance on the efforts made by the employer to keep the information at
issue from competitors. Id. at 265. Thus, if the information provides a competitive advantage
to its user, it may be a trade secret. Murrco Agency, 800 S.W.2d at 605 n.7.
385. See Martin, 793 S.W.2d at 670 n.3.
EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW
clients of Wackenhut. Within six months, one of Wackenhut's customers
terminated its contract with Wackenhut and signed a contract with DeSan-
tis' company. A second customer was considering doing the same when
Wackenhut filed suit against DeSantis and his company seeking an injunc-
tion to enforce the noncompetition agreement. After a trial on the merits,
the trial court enjoined DeSantis from disclosing Wackenhut's client list and
proprietary information, and enjoined his company from using any of Wack-
enhut's proprietary information. 386 The supreme court found that the cove-
nant not to compete was not necessary to protect any legitimate business
interest of Wackenhut and that the hardship on DeSantis outweighed any
necessity for the covenant; therefore, the covenant was not reasonable and
not enforceable. 38 7
The supreme court rejected Wackenhut's claim that the covenant pro-
tected its business goodwill that DeSantis developed during his employ-
ment.388 The court noted that there was only slight evidence that DeSantis
had developed any goodwill on behalf of Wackenhut and that there was no
showing that he had diverted any of that goodwill to his own benefit. 389
Significantly, evidence that he was competing with Wackenhut was not
enough to establish an interest requiring protection, 390 Wackenhut had to
prove that the covenant was necessary to prevent DeSantis from trading on
Wackenhut's goodwill.391
The court also rejected Wackenhut's claim that the covenant was neces-
386. DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 676.
387. Id. at 684. The Daytona court noted that the former employer in that case failed to
prove that the agreement was necessary to protect legitimate interests because there was no
showing that the former employee solicited business from any of the former employer's cus-
tomers, that she diverted any sales, or that she received any special training or trade secrets.
The former employer did not show any injury or risk of harm, so it failed to meet its burden of
proof under either the common law or the Act. Daytona, 800 S.W.2d 285, 289 (rex. App-
Corpus Christi 1990, no writ).
In Isuani v. Manske-Sheffield Radiology Group, P.A., 798 S.W.2d 346 (rex. App.-Beau-
mont 1990), rev'd per curiam, 34 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 292 (Jan. 22, 1991), the court found that the
promisee had a legitimate interest in "the preservation of [its] customers or clients." The
promisor in that case was a radiologist who practiced with a group of radiologists. The prom-
isor developed expertise and a number of subspecialties beyond the other radiologists.
Although the court found that the radiologist group had a legitimate interest to protect, the
court reformed the injunction to permit the promisor to practice his subspecialties because of
the injury to the public and because the specialties were not trade secrets imparted to him by
the promisees. Id. The court did not address whether his subspecialties could be considered
special training and knowledge. Interestingly, the court set out the requirements of § 15.50 in
the beginning of its analysis, but then cited the criteria found in Hill v. Mobile Auto Trim,
Inc., 725 S.W.2d 168 (rex. 1987), without offering any explanation of why it discussed the
criteria laid to rest in DeSantis. The court's decision was reversed by the supreme court be-
cause the court of appeals rendered its judgment on the temporary injunction 110 days after
the trial court rendered final judgment granting a permanent injunction against Isuani. 34
Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 293. Because the judgment on the permanent injunction rendered the ap-
peal on the temporary injunction moot, the supreme court dissolved all orders relating to the
temporary injunction and ordered the court of appeals to dismiss Isuani's appeal from the
temporary injunction. Id.
388. DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 684.





sary to protect its confidential information.392 Wackenhut pointed out that
through his employment, DeSantis learned the identity of Wackenhut's cus-
tomers, their special needs and requirements, Wackenhut's pricing policies,
its cost factors, and its bidding strategies. While the court noted that confi-
dential information may be protected by a covenant not to compete, Wack-
enhut made no showing that a covenant was necessary to protect its
customer information.393 The court specifically indicated no showing was
made that Wackenhut's customers could not be readily identified by some-
one outside its employ, that the information carried some competitive ad-
vantage, or that a customer's needs could not be identified by simply
contacting the customer.394 The court also noted that Wackenhut failed to
show that its pricing policies and bidding strategies were uniquely devel-
oped, that the information could not be obtained from the customers them-
selves, or that DeSantis took advantage of Wackenhut's cost factors in trying
to outbid Wackenhut. 395 Based upon these findings, the court held the cove-
nant unenforceable.396
The holding in DeSantis may be the result of a failure of proof. The opin-
ion suggests the court might have reached a different conclusion if Wacken-
hut had established four additional items: 1) it dealt with its customer
information in a confidential way; 2) its customers considered their security
needs to be confidential; 3) its pricing policies and bidding strategies were
unique; and 4) the use of such information gave its former employee an un-
fair competitive advantage.
Any agreement not to compete may only include reasonable limitations on
time, geographical area, and scope of activity restrained. 397 The limitations
must not be greater than necessary to protect the legitimate interest of the
promisee.398 In Juliette Fowler Homes the court found that the noncompeti-
tion clause at issue was unenforceable because it did not contain any limita-




396. DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 684.
397. Juliette Fowler Homes, 793 S.W.2d at 663; see TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 15.50(2) (agreement must contain reasonable limitations as to time, geographical area, and
scope of activity to be restrained) (Vernon Supp. 1991). In Property Tax Assocs., Inc. v.
Staffeldt, 800 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1990, no writ), the plaintiff executed a noncom-
petition agreement that prevented him from competing with his employer in El Paso, Bexar
and Dallas Counties for a period of two years after his termination of employment. On appeal,
the court reformed the noncompetition clause to apply to El Paso County only and affirmed
the two-year restriction. Id. at 350-51. In Webb v. Hartman Newspapers, Inc., 793 S.W.2d
302 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ), the noncompetition agreement pre-
vented the plaintiff from engaging in the publishing business within a fifty-mile radius of any
Hartman newspaper for three years after his termination of employment. Hartman owned
newspapers in Texas and Oklahoma; however, the plaintiff only worked in Fort Bend County,
Texas. Hartman fired the plaintiff, who began competing against Hartman in Fort Bend
County. The court of appeals modified the covenant to apply the geographic area of the news-
paper distributed in Fort Bend County, a ten mile radius, and affirmed it in all other respects.
Id. at 304-05.
398. Juliette Fowler Homes, 793 S.W.2d at 663.
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tions on geographical area or scope of activity. 399
3. Balancing Hardship on Promisor and the Public Against the Promisee's
Need for Protection
The final consideration in determining whether a noncompetition agree-
ment is a reasonable restraint of trade is the degree of hardship the restraint
causes the promisor and the degree of injury to the public.40o The court
indicated the nature of the promisor's job might be a factor in determining
reasonableness, but that it should not be the primary focus.40 Significantly,
the supreme court in DeSantis observed that the legislature rejected the com-
mon calling test in Hill v. Mobile Auto Trim, Ina,402 which provided that a
covenant that limits or restrains one's right to engage in a common calling
was unenforceable as a matter of law.4° 3 As the court correctly observed, if
employment can be defined as a "common calling," 404 then it is doubtful
that a noncompetition agreement will withstand scrutiny under the
CNCA.4° 5 While the nature of the employee's job may relate to the issue of
reasonableness, it is not the focus of the inquiry.406
While these cases do not address the effect of the Covenants Not to Com-
pete Act on noncompetition agreements, it is apparent from the cases that
the common law principles that existed prior to Hill v. Mobile Auto Trim,
Inc. are generally equivalent to the criteria set forth in CNCA. While the
legislature intended CNCA to reverse the supreme court's presumption that
the public policy of the state was against the enforcement of noncompetition
agreements by enacting a statute designed to enforce such agreements,407 the
supreme court's decisions in DeSantis, Martin and Juliette Fowler Homes
and its denial of the application for a writ of error in Bland v. Henry & Peters
suggest that the supreme court still finds noncompetition agreements some-
what offensive.
V. EMPLOYEE OR INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR?
Employers often contend that a worker is an independent contractor and
399. Id.
400. DeSants, 793 S.W.2d at 683.
401. Id.
402. 725 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 1987).
403. Id. at 172.
404. The court recognized that the term "common calling" escapes a clear definition and
correctly abandoned it as a test for determining the enforceability of noncompetition agree-
ments. DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 682-83; see Webb v. Hartman Newspapers, Inc., 793 S.W.2d
302, 304 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ) (section 15.50 of CNCA effectively
abolishes common calling defense to noncompetition agreement). In Hill Justice Gonzalez
criticized the court for adopting the common calling requirement without adopting a definition
for the term. Hill, 725 S.W.2d at 177 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting, joined by Hill, C.J., and Camp-
bell, J.). For a thorough discussion of the "common calling" test, see Pfeiffer & Hall, Employ-
ment and Labor Law, 43 Sw. L.J. 81, 104-05 (1989).
405. DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 682-83.
406. Id. at 683.
407. For an analysis of the legislative intent in enacting the Covenants Not to Compete
Act, see Pfeiffer & Hall, supra note 91, at 133-36.
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not an employee. Many times employers simply place the label "independ-
ent contractor" on a worker who is in reality an employee. However, simply
labeling a worker an independent contractor will not suffice under any the-
ory. The cases clearly indicate that the label "independent contractor" will
not transform an employee into an independent contractor.
In Thompson v. Travelers Indemnity Co.40 8 the Texas Supreme Court held
that a jockey who sought worker's compensation for injuries sustained at a
race track was not an employee of the race track. 4° 9 The court held that the
test to determine whether the claim arises at common law or under the
Workers' Compensation Act410 is the same one used to determine whether a
worker is an employee or an independent contractor, namely, whether the
employer has the right to control the progress, details, and methods of oper-
ations of the employee's work.41' Specifically, the employer must control
the means and details of the work and not just the end sought to be accom-
plished.412 The court concluded that this traditional test of right to control
applies in a worker's compensation claim.413 The court gave the following
examples of control over the means and details of the employee's work:
when and where to begin and stop work, regularity of hours, amount of time
spent on particular aspects of the work, tools and appliances used to perform
the work, and physical method or manner of accomplishing the end
result.41 4
Although the race track required jockeys to be licensed, monitored jock-
eys prior to, during, and after races, explained riding rules to the jockeys
before the race, required them to report to the race track one hour before the
first race of the day, required a mount fee, provided a saddle, towel and
helmet, and fined jockeys or revoked their licenses for a violation of the rac-
ing track rules, the court held that these factors did not establish, as a matter
of law, an employer-employee relationship.415 The evidence in the record
that supported the trial court's findings that the jockey was an independent
contractor demonstrated that the owner or trainer, not the track, controlled
the progress, details and methods of the jockey's work, e.g., the horse owners
freely selected the jockey from a daily pool of jockeys, the owners and train-
ers paid the mount fee, and the jockeys freely negotiated an additional purse
with the owner or trainer in the event of a successful race. Further, the
track did not prevent jockeys from racing at other tracks or remaining at the
track for the entire day or require the jockeys to ride any particular horse.
Finally, the track did not withhold taxes or social security from any jockey's
pay.
408. 789 S.W.2d 277 (Tex. 1990).
409. Id. at 279.
410. Id. at 278 (citing Elder v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 149 Tex. 620, 623, 236 S.W.2d
611, 613 (1951)).
411. Id. (citing Newspapers, Inc. v. Love, 380 S.W.2d 582, 585-90 (Tex. 1964)).




415. Id. at 279.
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The right to control theory was again applied in Ross v. Texas One Part-
nership.416 Leroy Ross sued Texas One Partnership for injuries he suffered
when a security guard patrolling the apartment complex owned by Texas
One Partnership shot Ross with a shotgun. Texas One moved for a sum-
mary judgment contending that it could not be held liable because the secur-
ity company was an independent contractor. In determining whether the
security guard was an independent contractor or an employee, the court
cited the following factors: I) the independent nature of the contractor's
business; 2) the contractor's obligation to supply necessary tools, supplies
and materials; 3) the contractor's right to control the progress of the work
except as to final result; 4) the time for which the contractor is employed;
and 5) the method by which the contractor is paid, whether by the time or
by the job.417 The court emphasized that the primary test involves a deter-
mination as to which of the parties has the right to control the details of the
work.418 The court observed that the contract between the security com-
pany and Texas One, viewed alone, established an independent contrhctor
relationship.419 The issue, therefore, was whether the contract was a sham
designed to conceal the true relationship between Texas One and the security
company. In reviewing who actually exercised control of the details of the
work performed by the security company, the court noted that the security
company was a separate business, independent of Texas One. The security
company supplied the necessary tools and materials used by the security
guards (badges, flashlights, guns, ammunition and handcuffs, etc.), and
Texas One did not provide any training to the security company personnel.
Therefore, the court held that, as a matter of law, the security company was
an independent contractor.420
In Wasson v. Stracener421 a worker brought a suit against a construction
company for personal injuries sustained as a passenger in a truck accident.
While the worker, Don Wasson, was hired as a welder's helper by Vernon
Freeman, a subcontractor, Wasson was paid by the construction company
and the construction company carried worker's compensation insurance on
Wasson. One of the issues was whether the trial court correctly found as a
matter of law that Freeman was an independent contractor.422 Following
the five factors set forth in Ross, the court observed that the construction
company had the right to tell Freeman how to do his job, when to report to
work, when to go to lunch, when to leave, how to get to a particular job and
that the construction company had the right to control his work.423 Accord-
ingly, the court reversed the summary judgment because there was a fact
issue as to whether Freeman was an employee or an independent contractor
416. 796 S.W.2d 206 ('ex. App.-Dallas 1990, no writ).
417. Id. at 210 (citing Pitchfork Land and Cattle Co. v. King, 162 Tex. 331, 346 S.W.2d,
598, 603 (1961)).
418. Id. (citing Newspapers, Inc. v. Love, 380 S.W.2d 582, 590 (Tex. 1964)).
419. Id. at 210-11.
420. Id. at 211-12.
421. 786 S.W.2d 414 (rex. App.-Texarkana 1990, writ denied).
422. Id. at 420.
423. Id. at 420-21.
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of the construction company.424
VI. NEGLIGENT HIRING
In Deerings West Nursing Center v. Scott425 the court addressed the com-
mon law duty of a nursing home to exercise reasonable care in the selection
of its medical staff. In Deerings, Velma Scott sued Deerings West Nursing
Center, alleging that the center was negligent and grossly negligent in the
hiring of an unlicensed nurse employee who assaulted her. Scott was visiting
her infirm older brother who was being cared for at the nursing center. She
arrived at the nursing center prior to regular visiting hours and Ken Hopper,
an unlicensed nurse employee, attempted to prevent Scott from visiting.
Hopper allegedly hit Scott on the chin, slapped her down and followed her
to the floor, pinning her there with his knee upon her chest. The jury
awarded $35,000 in actual damages and $200,000 in punitive damages upon
the finding that the nursing center was both negligent and grossly negligent
in the hiring of the unlicensed nurse employee. The nursing center appealed,
claiming that no evidence supported the jury's findings that the failure of
Hopper to have a Texas nursing license was a proximate cause of Scott's
damages. The court of appeals disagreed and affirmed the judgment.426 The
court held that the nursing home's responsibility to exercise reasonable care
in the selection of its medical staff was similar to the doctrine of negligent
entrustment, which places a duty on an automobile owner to determine the
competency of a person to whpm he entrusts his automobile.427 The court
found no reason why the analogy between negligent hiring and negligent
entrustment should not be applied.428 The court noted that Hopper had
fifty-six prior convictions for theft and that the investigative process neces-
sary for receiving a Texas nursing license would have precluded the licensing
of Hopper.429 The court reasoned that fifty-six convictions for theft was
some evidence of mental aberration and that Hopper was employed not only
to administer medicine, but to contend with the sometimes erratic behavior
of older patients; consequently, a nurse tending to the needs of the aged
should be a person of sound personality, not subject to a proven pattern of
424. Id. at 421.
425. 787 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1990, writ denied).
426. Id. at 496.
427. Id. at 495. To establish negligent entrustment in an automobile case, the plaintiff
must establish five elements "(1) entrustment of a vehicle by the owner; (2) to an unlicensed,
incompetent or reckless driver; (3) that the owner knew or should have known to be unli-
censed; (4) that the driver was negligent on the occasion in question; and (5) that the driver's
negligence proximately caused the accident." Id. at 496 (citing Schneider v. Esperanza Trans-
mission Co., 744 S.W.2d 595, 596 (Tex. 1987)). Proximate cause is established when it is
shown that the defendant entrustor should have reasonably anticipated that an injury would
result as a natural and probable consequence of the entrustment. Id. Liability is not predi-
cated upon the relationship of the parties; rather, it is based upon the theory that an automo-
bile may become a dangerous instrumentality when an owner negligently places an automobile
in the hands of an incompetent or reckless driver. Id.
428. Id. at 496.
429. Id.
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impulsive behavior.430
While Deerings was not decided under the statute that precludes nursing
homes and other similar facilities from hiring persons with criminal
records, 431 it indicates both the type of case that will give rise to liability
under the statute and cases involving common law negligent hiring claims.
A court deciding Deerings under the statute would have required the plain-
tiff to show that the nursing home failed to act in good faith in its investiga-
tion.432 It is conceivable that under the facts in Deerings the jury would
have found that the nursing home did not act in good faith in its investiga-
tion. Deerings underscores the scope of potential liability for negligent hir-
ing and indicates the type of liability that may exist under the Texas Human
Resources Code.
VII. EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY FOR AcTS OF MANAGEMENT EMPLOYEE
PERFORMING NON-MANAGEMENT TASKS
In Ramos v. Frito-Lay, Inc.433 the Texas Supreme Court held that an em-
ployer may be held liable for exemplary damages for the actions of its man-
agement level employee in performing non-managerial tasks. The supreme
court disagreed with the court of appeals' reasoning that there was no evi-
dence to support the exemplary damage award against Frito-Lay because, at
the time of the incident in question, the manager employee was not perform-
ing the usual tasks of a manager.434 The court also disagreed with the court
of appeals' analysis that it is the character of the employee's act, managerial
or non-managerial, that determines liability.435 The court held that the fo-
cus is whether the employee was acting in the scope of employment. 436 The
court reasoned that the purpose of the rule permitting exemplary damages to
be imposed upon an employer for the acts of his employees is to serve "as a
deterrent to the employment of unfit persons for important positions.1 437
The court further observed that to permit an employer to escape liability for
the outrageous acts of its management level employee, because the employee
was performing a non-managerial task, would severely undercut this deter-
rent.438 The court was simply unwilling to draw a distinction, unsupported
by the Restatement or by case law, between managerial and non-managerial
tasks.4 39
430. Id.
431. TEx. HuM. REs. CODE ANN. §§ 106.001-.012 (Vernon 1990). See Pfeifer & Hall,
supra note 91, at 126-28 (discussing TEx. HuM. REs. CODE ANN. §§ 106.001-.012 (Vernon
Supp. 1990)).
432. Id. § 106.011.
433. 784 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1990).
434. Id. at 668.
435. Id.
436. Id. at 668-69.
437. Id. at 669 (quoting RESATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 comment b (1979)).
438. Id.
439. Id. at 669.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
In past years, employers have generally studied the California courts to
discern directional trends regarding state employment law developments.
The employment law developments in Texas are generally forthcoming from
the courts and not the legislature, which has a far better opportunity than
the courts to microscopically analyze such effects on the commerce of this
state.440 Recently, employers have turned their attention from the Califor-
nia courts to the Texas courts because of the frequent employment law de-
velopments in Texas and the significant adverse effect of those developments
on Texas businesses. This shift in the focus of study from California to
Texas is both regrettable and damaging, at least with respect to economic
development in Texas, because it clearly evidences the uncertainty and the
lack of predictability in Texas employment law. Employers and their de-
fense counsel must, of necessity, keep abreast of developments in Texas and
be ever vigilant in their efforts to protect against further adverse changes.
440. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 397 n.31, 254 Cal.
Rptr. 211 (1988) ("Legislatures, in making such policy decisions,.have the ability to gather
empirical evidence, solicit the advice of experts, and hold hearings at which all interested par-
ties may present evidence and express their views .. "); Murphy v. American Home Prods.
Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983) ("If the rule of nonliability for
termination of at-will employment is to be tempered, it should be accomplished through a
principled statutory scheme, adopted after opportunity for public ventilation, rather than in
consequence of judicial resolution of the partisan arguments of individual adversarial litigants
.... The Legislature has infinitely greater resources and procedural means to discern the
public will, to examine the variety of pertinent considerations, to elicit the views of the various
segments of the community that would be directly affected and in any event critically inter-
ested, and to investigate and anticipate the impact of imposition of such liability."); Whittaker
v. Care-More, Inc., 621 S.W.2d 395, 396-97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981) ("[A]ny substantial change
in the 'employee-at-will' rule should first be microscopically analyzed regarding its effect on
the commerce of this state. There must be protection from substantial impairment of the very
legitimate interests of an employer in hiring and retaining the most qualified personnel avail-
able or the very foundation of the free enterprise system could be jeopardized .... Tennessee
has made enormous strides in recent years in its attraction of new industry of high quality
designed to increase the average per capita income of its citizens and thus, better the quality of
their lives. The impact on the continuation of such influx of new businesses should be carefully
considered before any substantial modification is made in the employee-at-will rule.") (emphasis
added).
